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Abstract
This dissertation studies the optimal management of two di↵erent dynamic systems
with learning: (i) diagnostic service systems, and (ii) green incentive policy design.
In both cases, analytical models have been developed to improve our understanding
of the system, and provide normative recommendations for their optimal control.
We first consider a diagnostic service system in a queueing framework, where the
service is in the form of sequential hypothesis testing. The agent should dynamically
weigh the benefit of performing an additional test on the current task to improve
the accuracy of her judgment against the incurred delay cost for the accumulated
workload. We analyze the accuracy/congestion tradeo↵ in this setting and fully char-
acterize the structure of the optimal policy. Further, we allow for admission control
(dismissing tasks from the queue without processing) in the system, and derive its
implications on the structure of the optimal policy and system’s performance.
We then study Feed-in-Tari↵ (FIT) policies, which are incentive mechanisms by
governments to promote renewable energy technologies. We focus on two key network
externalities that govern the evolution of a new technology in the market over time:
(i) technological learning, and (ii) social learning. By developing an intertemporal
model that captures these dynamics, we investigate how lawmakers should leverage
on such e↵ects to make FIT policies more e cient. We contrast our findings against
the current practice of FIT-implementing jurisdictions, and also determine how the
FIT regimes should depend on specific technology and market characteristics.
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1Introduction
Dynamic management of complex systems often requires balancing the cost of today’s
action against its future value. This is especially true when the system’s evolution
is governed by a learning component so that what is learned now (as a consequence
of our action) forms our perception of the system’s state in the future. In this dis-
sertation, we study problems of this sort that involve policy and social implications
and/or private-public interactions. While this covers a wide spectrum of applica-
tions in the field of Operations Management, the focus of this dissertation is on the
following two areas: (i) optimal management of diagnostic service systems, and (ii)
incentive policy design for promoting green technology adoption. Due to the lack
of su cient data in these areas to run full-fledged empirical studies, we have tried
to o↵er normative recommendations by applying cutting-edge Operations Research
methodologies. The analytical models developed in this dissertation are at the nexus
of theoretical rigor and practical relevance, and are intended to deliver managerial
insights that advance our understanding of complex systems.
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1.1 Optimal Control of Diagnostic Service Systems
The dynamic balance of diagnostic accuracy against congestion in diagnostic service
systems is the first theme in this dissertation. In diagnostic services where tasks
accumulate, agents typically need to weigh the benefit of acquiring additional in-
formation and improving the accuracy of diagnosis against the cost of delaying the
provision of services to others. The agent learns more about the task in service and
updates her belief accordingly if she decides to spend the time and collect addi-
tional information. Our goal has been to address the accuracy/congestion tradeo↵
encountered in these settings. Nurse triage systems provide a typical example of
such systems. Remanufacturing processes, support centers and help desks are other
examples that can be captured by this framework.
While the general problem of value/congestion tradeo↵ has been addressed in
the Operations Management literature, diagnostic services introduce new challenges.
In these systems, the service takes the form of sequential hypothesis testing and
the value o↵ered to the customer is not deterministically increasing in service time.
Hence, the state of the system should also keep track of the test results obtained thus
far. The belief about the customer’s type should be updated after each test result, so
that it represents a summary statistic of the observed signals. The dynamic control
of the system consists of determining whether the current customer should undergo
additional tests or be identified as one of the possible types, depending on the state.
In Chapter 2, we study a diagnostic service system which faces an arriving stream
of customers. The agent’s task is to uncover each customer’s type, which can be one
of the two possible types. The agent has access to a sequence of tests, each of which
takes time to perform and provides a signal in support of one of the types. Tests
are imperfect in the sense that they may produce wrong signals. Once a test result
comes back, the agent uses Bayes’ rule to update her belief about the customer’s
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type. We fully characterize the structure of the optimal policy in this setting, and
provide normative recommendations on the optimal control of the system.
Our results reveal that the agent should continue to perform diagnosis as long as
her current belief about the customer’s type falls into an interval, which depends on
the congestion level and the number of performed tests. This search interval should
shrink as congestion intensifies. It also shrinks in the number of performed tests if
the sequence of tests is well-ordered. We highlight the managerial insights in our
framework which di↵er from general service systems or single diagnostic tasks.
Chapter 3 elaborates on the role of admission control in a sequential decision
making process with task accumulation. That is, at any point in time, we allow
for the decision-maker to release a task from the queue unprocessed and make the
terminal decision only based on her prior information. This gives the decision-maker
the flexibility to dynamically control the capacity of the queue (e.g., by blocking
arrivals) in order to improve the system’s performance. This problem turns out
to be quite complex, and the analysis approach includes subtle uses of dynamic
programming techniques.
We are able to fully characterize the optimal policy in this framework when tests
are identical, and observe that it possesses an interestingM-shaped structure. This
implies that when ambiguity about the state of the current task is high, it is optimal
for the decision-maker to keep the task in service and instead, alleviate congestion
by releasing tasks from the queue.
1.2 Policy Design Issues in Green Technology Di↵usion
Designing e↵ective and cost-e cient policy instruments to foster green technology
deployment forms the second theme in this dissertation. What makes this problem
interesting is the presence of social and technological learning e↵ects in the market
which influence the investors’ response to any specific policy initiative o↵ered by
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the state. In particular, we study how lawmakers should leverage on these market
dynamics when designing such incentive mechanisms. The evolution trajectory of a
new technology is governed by two key network externalities, which together form
the dynamics of the market over time: (i) technological learning, and (ii) di↵usion
process. Technological learning takes place as a result of knowledge accumulation
and competition, and has been widely studied in the Economics literature under ex-
perience curve or learning-by-doing. Di↵usion process is concerned with e↵ects such
as spread of information and social learning, and has a vast literature in Marketing.
In the presence of such dynamics, the regulators can adjust the level of support
o↵ered under the government program as time progresses, in order to optimally nav-
igate the pace and scope of the technology growth. Our interest in these problems
is grounded in analyzing the dynamics of the adoption behaviors in the market, and
providing policy recommendations that exploit their learning and di↵usion implica-
tions. Problems of this sort are closely linked to dynamic pricing literature and o↵er
a new and exciting line of research in revenue management.
Feed-in-tari↵s (FITs) are policy instruments that attract investments in renew-
able energy by setting a long-term guaranteed purchase agreement for green power
producers to sell their electricity into the grid. The eventual goal of FIT regimes
is to drive down the cost of renewables, via promoting innovation and learning and
to the verge of self-sustainability, so that they can compete with conventional en-
ergy supplies. The performance of FITs as a way to stimulate renewable energies
is, however, very mixed. If this policy helped Germany become the world leader in
solar technology, Spain’s FIT program turned out to be a huge failure and had to be
hastily interrupted.
In Chapter 4, we attempt to shed light on the driving forces behind these dif-
ferent outcomes. We propose a dynamic optimization modeling framework that
captures learning and di↵usion dynamics. The policymaker’s objective is to achieve
4
the policy target at minimum cost. We study the problem under two di↵erent sce-
narios: (i) exogenously-imposed capacity or cost targets with binding timetables,
and (ii) endogenously-induced policy horizon with grid-parity goal. We show that
the investments’ profitability under the optimal FIT program should either consis-
tently increase or decrease over time. This is in contrast with current practices of
FIT-implementing jurisdictions which typically try to maintain the same level of
profitability across the policy horizon. Further, we determine how the structure
of the optimal policy scheme (ascending vs. descending profitability) changes with
technology and market characteristics such as learning rate and penetration speed.
5
2Diagnostic Accuracy Under Congestion
In diagnostic services, agents typically need to weigh the benefit of running an addi-
tional test and improving the accuracy of diagnosis against the cost of delaying the
provision of services to others. This chapter analyzes how to dynamically manage
this accuracy/congestion trade-o↵. To that end, we study an elementary congested
system facing an arriving stream of customers. The diagnostic process consists of a
search problem in which the service provider conducts a sequence of imperfect tests
to determine the customer’s type. We find that the agent should continue to per-
form the diagnose as long as her current belief that the customer is of a given type
falls into an interval which depends on the congestion level as well as the number of
performed tests thus far. This search interval should shrink as congestion intensifies,
and as the number of performed tests increases if additional conditions hold. Our
study reveals that, contrary to diagnostic services without congestion, the base rate
(i.e. the prior probability of the customer type) has an e↵ect on the agent’s search
strategy. In particular, the optimal search interval shrinks when customer types
are more ambiguous a priori, i.e. as the base rate approaches the value at which
the agent is indi↵erent between types. Finally, due to congestion e↵ects, the agent
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should sometimes diagnose the customer as being of a given type, even if test results
indicate otherwise. All these insights disappear in the absence of congestion.
2.1 Introduction
Diagnostic services focus on determining customer needs, but do not themselves
perform any subsequent treatments that may be indicated by the diagnosis. Accu-
mulating information and running additional tests on a customer is likely to improve
the diagnosis, the accuracy of which obviously a↵ects the value of the service of-
fered. Accumulating and processing information, however, takes time and therefore,
increases congestion in the system. The service provider thus needs to weigh the
benefit of running an additional test against the cost of delaying the provision of
services to others.
Triage nursing systems provide a typical example of such tradeo↵s. The nurse
elicits di↵erent pieces of information to assess the severity of the patient’s symp-
toms (Gerdtz and Bucknall 2001). On the other hand, long triage processes can
result in adverse patient outcomes (Travers 1999). Another example of an accu-
racy/congestion tradeo↵ occurs at MTU Aero Engines, which is Germany’s leading
provider of engine maintenance. One key decision the company needs to make is
whether to keep or replace expensive parts of an engine. The diagnosis is performed
by a dedicated team of workers, who may have many parts awaiting inspection. This
can yield high costs of delay in an industry that is subject to intensive time-based
competition. A similar task confronts those who carry out remanufacturing pro-
cesses, which typically require determining whether returned parts are obsolete or
not (Guide and Wassenhove 2001). Finally, the need to accurately determine a cus-
tomer type under congestion also frequently occurs in some non-diagnostic systems,
such as support centers and help desks (de Ve´ricourt and Zhou 2005).
In this chapter, we attempt to gain insight into this problem of dynamically
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balancing accuracy against delays in the process of rendering a diagnosis. To that
end, we study an elementary diagnostic system facing a random stream of customers.
The service consists in identifying each customer to be one of two types, ⌧¯ or ⌧ .
Accuracy is defined as the probability that the customer type is correctly diagnosed.
We represent the diagnostic process as a sequential test problem in which the agent
performs imperfect tests one by one. The test result may be either “positive” or
“negative”. We assume that all customers start with a base rate probability p0 of
being type ⌧¯ , and each test result updates the subjective probability of customer
type according to Bayes’ rule.
Running a test takes time; service demands may therefore accumulate. More tests
generally produce more accurate diagnosis, but also induce longer waiting times. In
order to limit delays in the system, the agent may stop the diagnostic process at
any time and move to the next customer. We formulate this problem of balancing
diagnostic accuracy against delays as a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process,
and characterize the structure of the optimal decision rule that maximizes the long
run average value to the service provider, which includes rewards for correctly identi-
fying customer type as well as costs associated with misidentifications and delays. In
particular, we show that the service provider should perform additional tests as long
as her current probability of the customer being of type ⌧¯ falls into an interval which
depends on the congestion level as well as the number of performed tests thus far.
We show that the optimal search interval shrinks as congestion intensifies. Further,
we show that when more informative tests are run first, the optimal search interval
also shrinks with the number of performed tests.
Our analysis reveals general insights into the impact of congestion on managing
diagnostic systems. First, the base rate of a customer type has an e↵ect on the
agent’s search strategy. In particular, the optimal search interval shrinks when cus-
tomer types are more ambiguous a priori, i.e. as p0 approaches the value at which
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the agent is indi↵erent between types. By contrast, the base rate can be ignored
altogether when designing diagnostic services with no congestion, i.e. for dynamic
search problems without accumulation of tasks.
Further, we demonstrate that the agent sometimes should stop the diagnostic
process and identify the customer type against the result of a test. This means,
for example, that a customer may be identified as type ⌧ even if test results are
all positive. Again, e↵ects such as these never occur for diagnostic services in the
absence of congestion.
Finally, we apply these findings to the special case of diagnosis where a nega-
tive test perfectly reveals type ⌧ and terminates the process. This corresponds to
settings, where tests are treated as one sided and false negatives assumed to be negli-
gible. An example is the protocol designed by Breiman et al. (1984), which classifies
heart attack patients according to risks; 1 See, also, HP Renew Program (2009) for
examples in a remanufacturing setting.2 More generally, stress testing of products
is commonly used in many industries (such as maintenance, production and IT in-
dustries) and typically consists of sequentially checking whether a part conforms to
di↵erent tolerance levels. A part fails the stress test as soon as it fails to satisfy
one of these specifications. In our framework, type ⌧ customers correspond to non-
conforming parts, while the tests with one sided errors correspond to checking the
di↵erent tolerance levels.
When the diagnostic process is one sided, managing the system does not require
updating the service provider’s belief probability with Bayes’ rule, and our results
1 The protocol tests in the following order, whether the blood pressure is above a pre-specified
threshold, whether the patient is older than 62.5 years, or whether sinus tachycardia is present. The
diagnosis process stops and classifies the patient as low risk as soon as a test result is negative. The
process moves to next test otherwise (see, also, Goldstein and Gigerenzer 1999.). In our framework,
type ⌧ customers correspond to the low risk patients and the diagnosis process falls into the one
sided test case.
2 In particular, an incoming product needs to be replaced if it fails one of four (binary) cosmetic
tests.
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can be expressed in terms of the number of performed tests and the number of cus-
tomers in the system. This also yields a representation, which is akin to formulations
found in the queueing literature. In this setting, the optimal decision rule may be
characterized by a threshold on the number of customers allowed in the system.
When tests are performed in the order of their accuracy, the optimal policy can be
represented as two monotone thresholds in the number of tests performed.
Research in the field of operations management has addressed the problem of
balancing congestion against the value o↵ered to the customer. Hopp et al. (2007)
propose a queueing model with Poisson demand and deterministic service time, in
which the value o↵ered to the customer is an increasing concave function of the service
time. The objective is to balance the congestion related costs against the generated
value. The authors show that, under the optimal policy, the service time should
decrease with the level of congestion, or, equivalently, that the maximum number of
customers allowed in the system should decrease with service time. Bouns (2003)
study the same model, except that the service time has an Erlang distribution. The
agent can then dynamically adjust the number of stages of the distribution to max-
imize profit. The optimal policy possesses a similar structure in that the maximum
number of customers allowed in the system should decrease with the current stage
of the service time. A related problem is the speed-congestion tradeo↵ studied by
George and Harrison (2001), where the agent continuously adjust the service rate in
order to minimize congestion-related and service rate costs3 (see also Crabill 1972,
Crabill et al. 1977, and Stidham and Weber 1993 for earlier works on this problem).
The optimal policy is shown to increase the maximum number of customers allowed
in the system with the service rate.
Our diagnostic system retains the basic elements of most previous models, with
3 Service rate costs can be interpreted in our context as customer disutility; the faster the service,
the lower the generated value. With this interpretation, minimizing service rate cost is equivalent
to maximizing value.
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the main departure in its representation of the service process as a sequential testing
problem. This change, however, yields di↵erent results and insights. First, diagnostic
services require tracking the belief probability in addition to the current congestion
level and service time. For example, we are able to study the impact of the cus-
tomer type base rate, which has no equivalent counterpart in the previous models.
Nonetheless, managing the one sided case does not require updating the belief prob-
abilities with Bayes’ rule and is more akin to the value/congestion tradeo↵ models.
However, while a decreasing threshold on congestion levels describes optimal rules
in the previous queueing literature, our optimal structure requires two thresholds
on the number of performed tests, or, equivalently, one unimodal threshold on the
level of congestion (under some additional conditions on test accuracy). In essence,
our optimal rule for diagnostic services retains a more general form of monotonicity
property, with a search interval which shrinks as congestion intensifies.
Recent research on customer behavior in congested systems has also focused on
issues related to the value/congestion tradeo↵. In particular, Wang et al. (2008)
study patient behaviors in a call center of triage nurses, where the service corresponds
to performing diagnoses (see also Anand et al. (2008) for the study of speed-quality
tradeo↵s with strategic customers). The service corresponds to a continuous search
problem that does not dynamically depend on congestion levels, as it does in our
study. Thus, their model cannot account for our findings. On the other hand, their
model allows exploring the impact of di↵erent system parameters on demand, an
issue we do not address.
Finally, when there is ample service capacity such that arriving customers always
find an available agent (i.e., when the number of servers is infinite), the correspond-
ing diagnostic system reduces to a single diagnostic task problem with no congestion.
The optimal decision rules for these systems without congestion are well established.
Specifically, the one sided search problem is treated in Bertsekas (2007a) while the
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symmetrical two sided test problem was first solved by Edwards (1965). More gen-
erally, these two systems are special cases of sequential hypothesis testing problems
(see, for instance, Wald 1947, and DeGroot 1970), which have not been studied un-
der congestion, to the best of our knowledge. It is worth noting that all our insights
which include the impact of the base rate on the optimal rule, or a type identification
that goes against all test results, disappear when there is no congestion.
We present the model in the next section. The optimal decision rules are charac-
terized in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we study the special case of one sided tests. We
present the e↵ect of the base rate in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Models of Diagnostic Services
Consider a service provider serving customers arriving according to a Poisson process
with rate  . The server performs tests one by one in order to identify a customer’s
type, which can be either ⌧¯ or ⌧ . Each test takes an exponentially distributed time
with rate µ. We denote ⇢ ”  {µ to be the test utilization rate, that is, the average
number of arriving customers while a test is performed. The number of available
tests may be infinite. The system is preemptive in the sense that a test can be
stopped at any time.
A test result is either positive (signaling type ⌧¯), or negative (signaling type
⌧). Tests, however, are not perfect and may produce false outcome. In particular,
conditional upon the customer being of type ⌧¯ , the k ` 1st test returns a positive
result with probability ↵k. Similarly, the k ` 1st test returns a negative result with
probability  k given a type ⌧ customer. After receiving a test result, the agent
updates her belief probability on the customer’s type.
We denote pk to represent the probability of a customer being type ⌧¯ after com-
pleting the first k tests. Probability p0 is the agent’s initial belief about a customer
being type ⌧¯ , or, the base rate of type ⌧¯ customers in the population. Probability pk
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evolves according to the Bayes’ rule. If the next test result is positive, the posterior
probability becomes
pk`1 “ ⇡`k ppkq ” ↵kpk↵kpk ` p1´  kqp1´ pkq . (2.1)
If the result is negative, on the other hand, the posterior probability becomes
pk`1 “ ⇡´k ppkq ” p1´ ↵kqpkp1´ ↵kqpk `  kp1´ pkq . (2.2)
At any time, the agent needs to decide whether to run a new test or terminate the
diagnosis process and proceed to the next customer. Specifically, the agent can take
one of the following three actions: stop testing and identify the customer as type
⌧¯ ; stop testing and identify the customer as type ⌧ ; or continue testing. Correctly
identifying a type ⌧¯ customer brings value v¯ to the system. This reward may also
include the benefit of subsequent services that ⌧¯ customers may receive. Examples
include the value of repairing a part in maintenance services, or treating a patient,
etc. On the other hand, missing and releasing a type ⌧¯ customer as ⌧ incurs a
misidentification cost c¯. This corresponds to the disutility of not providing required
health care or the expected cost of potential failures when the part is not repaired.
Similarly, we denote by v and c the reward and misidentification cost associated
with a type ⌧ customer, respectively. If the agent identifies the customer as type ⌧¯
given her current probability p, the expected reward is equal to r¯ppq ” pv¯´p1´ pqc.
The corresponding expected reward for identifying the customer as type ⌧ is rppq ”
p1´ pqv ´ pc¯.
We can then define ✓ as the unique value of p which satisfies r¯ppq “ rppq. That
is,
✓ “ v ` c
v¯ ` c¯` v ` c .
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Critical fraction ✓ highlights the relative value of correctly identifying type ⌧¯ cus-
tomers. In particular, ✓ decreases with pv¯ ` c¯q{pv ` cq. From the definition of ✓,
we see that if p • ✓ (resp. p † ✓), then r¯ppq • rppq (resp. r¯ppq † rppq) and the
service provider would diagnose the customer as type ⌧¯ (resp. ⌧), were she to stop
the search process. We also consider a waiting cost cwpxq per unit of time which is
incurred when x customers are present in the system. We impose no restrictions on
cwpxq other than it being strictly increasing in x • 0 with cwp0q “ 0 and unbounded
(i.e., limxÑ8 cwpxq “ `8).
A control policy determines the agent’s action at any point in time. The perfor-
mance of a policy is then measured as the long-run average profit. For control policy
u, we define the corresponding long-run average profit gu as,
gu “ lim inf
TÑ8
1
T
E
„
v¯N¯upT q ` v NupT q ´ c¯M¯upT q ´ cMupT q ´
ª T
0
cwpXuptqqdt
⇢
(2.3)
where N¯uptq (resp. Nuptq) is the random cumulative number of correctly identified
type ⌧¯ (resp. ⌧) customers up to time t; similarly, M¯uptq (resp. Muptq) is the
random cumulative number of misidentified type ⌧¯ (resp. ⌧) customers up to time t;
and Xuptq is a random process representing the number of customers in the system
at time t. Later we will show that the optimal policy which maximizes the long-run
average profit is stationary, and we define g˚ to be the optimal long-run average
profit.
Equation (2.3) captures an accuracy/congestion tradeo↵. Indeed, given control
policy u under which the system is stable, the expected total number of type ⌧¯ (resp.
⌧) customers going through the service is p0 t (resp. p1´ p0q t) as t goes to infinity.
Denote accuracy  ¯u as the probability that the service correctly identifies a type
⌧¯ customer. Similarly, accuracy  u is the corresponding conditional probability for
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type ⌧ . It follows that,
 ¯u “ lim inf
TÑ8
E
“
N¯upT q‰
p0 T
and  u “ lim inf
TÑ8
E rNupT qs
p1´ p0q T .
The long-run average profit is then equal to,
gu “ a¯ ¯u ` a  u ´ lim inf
TÑ8
1
T
E
„ª T
0
cwpXuptqqdt
⇢
` b (2.4)
where a¯ ”  p0pv¯` c¯q, a ”  p1´ p0qpv` cq and b ”  p0pc´ c¯q´ c, which holds from
the conservation of flow of ⌧¯ and ⌧ customers. In particular, the impact of policy u
on the system performance changes with v¯, v, c¯ and c only through the total rewards
v¯ ` c¯ and v ` c.
2.3 Optimal Rules for Diagnostic Services with Congestion
The problem of finding the optimal decision rule corresponds to a Partially Observed
Markov Decision Process (POMDP). The state space is represented as px, k, pq, in
which x is the number of customers in the system, k is the number of completed
tests, and p is the probability of the customer in service being type ⌧¯ . In fact,
probability p is a su cient statistic for the test results obtained thus far. Although
in theory decisions can be made at any time, the exponential inter-arrival and test
time assumption allows us to only consider decisions made when an arrival occurs or
a test is completed without loss of optimality. The optimality equation is, therefore,
g ` Jpx, k, pq “ max
!
´ cwpxq `  Jpx` 1, k, pq ` µ`↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡`k ppq˘
`µ`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡´k ppq˘,
g ` r¯ppq ` Jpx´ 1, 0, p0q,
g ` rppq ` Jpx´ 1, 0, p0q
)
, for x • 1 and k • 0 and 0 § p § 1, (2.5)
g ` Jp0, 0, p0q “  Jp1, 0, p0q ` µJp0, 0, p0q,
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where r¯ppq and rppq are the expected profits of assigning type ⌧¯ and ⌧ , respectively,
as defined in Section 2.2. Recall from the definition of ✓ that if p • ✓, then r¯ppq •
rppq. Therefore, according to Optimality Equation (2.5), the optimal diagnose depends on
whether p is larger or smaller than ✓.
The following theorem, which presents our first theoretical result, describes the optimal
policy structure as two thresholds in p.
Theorem 1. For diagnostic systems with congestion, the optimal rule can be characterized
by two thresholds ppx, kq and p¯px, kq on probability p for any given x and k, where ppx, kq §
✓ § p¯px, kq. Performing an additional test is optimal when probability p satisfies ppx, kq †
p † p¯px, kq. Otherwise, it is optimal to stop testing and identify the customer as type ⌧ when
p § ppx, kq, or as type ⌧¯ when p • p¯px, kq. Furthermore, threshold ppx, kq is nondecreasing
in x, while p¯px, kq is nonincreasing in x; and there exists x¯ such that ppx, kq “ p¯px, kq “ ✓
for all x • x¯.
The main idea of the proof is based on showing that the value function Jpx, k, pq is
convex in p through value iteration of the corresponding discounted case4 along with subtle
sample path arguments. The complete proof is presented in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1 states that the service provider conducts tests as long as her probability
about the customer type belongs to an px, kq-dependent interval, the length of which de-
creases as congestion (i.e., the number of customers in the system, x) intensifies. Figure
2.1(a) illustrates the result for a diagnostic service with five tests. The figure depicts thresh-
olds ppx, 3q and p¯px, 3q for the optimal policy when k “ 3, that is after three tests have
been performed. The dots on the grids represent states of the system in which performing
the next test is optimal. The upward (resp. downward) triangles correspond to the states
in which stopping the search and identifying the customer as type ⌧¯ (resp. ⌧) is optimal.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is as follows. The expected profit of stopping the
diagnosis process (i.e. max trppq, r¯ppqu), is the lowest when p “ ✓. In this case, the
service provider is actually indi↵erent between identifying the customer as type ⌧ and ⌧¯ .
4 Such a claim is far from obvious from the Bellman’s Equation (2.5). Furthermore, due to the
maximization operator, the value function is not di↵erentiable. Therefore, the proof requires a
careful study of the subgradient.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Policy for a Diagnostic System with Congestion
p0 “ 0.52, ↵1 “ 0.68, ↵2 “ 0.55, ↵3 “ 0.6, ↵4 “ 0.65, ↵5 “ 0.75,  1 “ 0.71,  2 “
0.65,  3 “ 0.52,  4 “ 0.6,  5 “ 0.8, ⇢ “ 0.4, v¯ “ 180, v “ 135, c¯ “ c “ 0, cwpxq “
x and (a) k “ 3, (b) k “ 4. (The model parameters are chosen to demonstrate
that thresholds may be non-monotone in k in general. Further discussion on this is
presented at the end of this section.)
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Therefore, the value of information from an additional test is also the highest when p “ ✓.
As a result, the service provider is willing to bear higher congestion costs for additional
tests when probability p is close to ✓. On the other hand, when p is away from ✓, the
value of running additional tests is low and the agent aborts the search at lower levels of
congestion. Thus, the optimal policy takes the form of an interval around ✓, which shrinks
as the queue length increases. Note also that when p0 is su ciently far away from ✓, or the
waiting cost high enough, directly identifying customers without performing any test, i.e.,
a degenerate policy, is optimal. This happens when p0 § pp1, 0q or p0 • p¯p1, 0q. In this
case, no diagnostic service is required and every customer is identified as type ⌧¯ if p0 • ✓
or ⌧ otherwise.
One immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that the service provider may stop the
search and identify the customer against a test result. This means, for instance, that
the service provider may diagnose the customer as type ⌧¯ , even though the lastet test
indicated ⌧ . To see this, consider Figures 2.1(a) and 2.1(b), where Figure 2.1(b) depicts
the optimal policy after an additional test has been performed (i.e. for k “ 4). In state
px “ 1, k “ 3, p “ 0.75q, Figure 2.1(a) indicates that the agent should run an additional
test. Assume then that this additional test result is negative so that the value of probability
p decreases from 0.75 to p “ 0.64. According to Figure 2.1(b), performing the next test
is still optimal in the new system state px “ 1, k “ 4, p “ 0.64q. If, however, two more
customers arrive while the next test is still running, the level of congestion reaches x “ 3
and stopping the search to identify the customer as type ⌧¯ becomes optimal. This is despite
the negative result of the last performed test, which indicated type ⌧ . In other words, the
service provider has incurred a cost for performing the previous test, but then ignored its
result and stopped the search.
In fact, an agent who makes a diagnose in presence of congestion can end up identifying
a customer as type ⌧¯ , even though all performed test results has indicated type ⌧ . This
is because congestion costs might become too high due to the accumulation of new tasks
during the diagnostic process. Hence, this observation highlights a di↵erence between
diagnostic services with and without congestion. Without congestion, the agent never
makes a diagnose against the previous test result. (See Appendix A.3, Proposition 9.)
In short, Theorem 1 provides monotonicity properties of the optimal policy in the
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number of customers. On the other hand, it does not claim anything about the e↵ect of
the number of performed tests. In the special case of systems with an infinite number of
identical tests such that ↵k “ ↵ and  k “   for all k, the optimal thresholds defined in
Theorem 1 do not depend on k (see Equations (2.1-2.2) and (2.5)). This corresponds, for
instance, to situations where the agent can re-run the same test many times independently.
Beside these specific systems, however, the number of tests has an e↵ect on the search
interval. In fact, thresholds ppx, kq and p¯px, kq may not be monotone in the number of
tests, k, in general. Nonetheless, consider the following sequence of tests,
Definition 1. Let probabilities p↵1, 1q and p↵2, 2q characterize tests 1 and 2, respectively.
We say that test 1 is more informative than test 2 if there exist ⇠1 and ⇠2, with 0 §
⇠1, ⇠2 § 1, such that ↵2 “ ⇠1↵1 ` ⇠2p1´ ↵1q and 1´  2 “ ⇠2 1 ` ⇠1p1´  1q. A sequence of
K tests is then well-ordered if test k is more informative than test pk` 1q for all k † K.
When tests are well-ordered according to Definition 1, the next result states that the
thresholds are also monotone in k,
Proposition 1. When tests are well-ordered, optimal thresholds p¯px, kq and ppx, kq are
nonincreasing and nondecreasing in k, respectively.
Intuitively, the conditions of Definition 1 state that test 2 outcomes are noisy signals
of test 1 outcomes. In particular, conditioning on a positive test 1 result, test 2 gives a
positive signal with probability ⇠1; similarly, given a negative test 1 result, test 2 gives a
negative signal with probability p1 ´ ⇠2q. These conditions are similar to the conditions
in Blackwell’s Theorem (Blackwell 1953), which establishes a connection between noisy
information structures and stochastic dominance, albeit in a setting very di↵erent from
ours.
When the the service provider can choose the order in which tests are performed, a well-
order sequence of tests always maximizes the system profit (the proof is omitted). However,
Definition 1 describes a partial order and a well-ordered sequences may not always exist
(this is, for instance, the case for ↵1 “ 0.7,  1 “ 0.8, ↵2 “ 0.75 and  2 “ 0.75). The agent
may also need to perform less informative tests first because of factors that our model does
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not directly capture.5 In any case, when tests are not well-ordered, the search interval can
actually expand in k. This means that for fixed values of x and p, the agent stops the
process after k but continues the search after k ` 1 tests. Figure 2.1 depicts such a case.
According to Figure 2.1(a), the agent stops the process when k “ 3, for x “ 9 and p “ 0.37.
However, according to Figure 2.1(b) the agent continues the search when k “ 4, for x “ 9
and p “ 0.37. This is because Test 4 is less informative than Tests 3 and 5 in our example.
It is not worth performing an additional less informative test after Test 3. However, if Test
4 has been performed, continuing the search with Test 5 becomes valuable again.
2.4 The One-Sided Case
In many settings, diagnostic processes are treated as one sided in the sense that false
negatives are negligible. In our framework, this means that ↵k “ 1 for all k and the
process stops as soon as a test is negative, in which case the customer is identified as
type ⌧ without possible error. Managing one sided systems does not require tracking
belief probability p anymore since this information is fully captured by the number of tests
performed (and therefore positive test results obtained) thus far. The number of performed
tests is then directly related to the time spent serving the customer. Formulating the
accuracy/congestion tradeo↵ with state px, kq, therefore, allows contrasting our findings
with the value/congestion tradeo↵ studied in the queueing literature.
More specifically, for one sided systems, test number k uniquely determines belief prob-
ability pk, which is defined as the probability of the customer being type ⌧¯ after k positive
test results. The state space thus reduces to px, kq and Bayes’ rules (2.1) and (2.2) simplify
to
pk`1 “ pk1´  k `  kpk , (2.6)
such that probability pk is increasing in k. We also define k✓ as the smallest k for which
pk • ✓. Hence, for all k • k✓, we have r¯ppkq • rppkq, and diagnosing the customer as ⌧¯ is
optimal, should the diagnosis process stop.
Theorem 1 implies that the optimal policy of the one sided case is characterized by a
threshold x¯pkq for any given k (and therefore the corresponding pk). That is, continuing
5 For example, a biopsy might be the definitive test for a medical condition but starting with a
simple blood test might be economically desirable.
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the search is optimal when x is less than x¯pkq given that k tests have been positive thus
far; when x • x¯pkq, on the other hand, it is optimal to stop the search and identify the
customer as type ⌧¯ if k • k✓, or as type ⌧ otherwise. However, in general, threshold
x¯pkq is not monotone or unimodal in the number of tests. Therefore the optimal policy
cannot always be characterized as a search interval (or two thresholds) in k for a given x.
Nonetheless, when the tests are well-ordered (Definition 1), optimal threshold x¯pkq can be
shown to be unimodal, which implies that the optimal policy can be described as a search
interval in k. For the one sided test case, well-ordered tests are equivalent to nonincreasing
 k’s. The next proposition formally makes this point,
Proposition 2. When tests are one-sided, if  k is nonincreasing in k, then the optimal
rule can be characterized by two queue length dependent thresholds kpxq and k¯pxq such
that kpxq † k✓ § k¯pxq. Performing an additional test is optimal when kpxq † k † k¯pxq.
Otherwise, it is optimal to stop the search and identify the customer as type ⌧ when k §
kpxq, or as type ⌧¯ when k • k¯pxq. Furthermore, kpxq and k¯pxq are nondecreasing and
nonincreasing in x, respectively.
We should stress that Proposition 2 is not an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and
Proposition 1. Indeed, Proposition 2 requires that when the optimal decision in state px, kq
stops the process and identifies the customer as type ⌧ , the same decision must also be
optimal in state px, k´ 1q. This statement, however, is not directly supported by Theorem
1 or Proposition 1. The complete proof is in Appendix A.2.
Figure 2.2 depicts an example of the optimal policy for a one sided system. The service
provider performs up to 10 tests when a single customer is present in the system (i.e.,
x “ 1 with k¯p1q “ 10 and kp1q † 0). The maximum number of tests, k¯p¨q, decreases with
x to reach k✓ “ 4. At the same time, lower threshold kp¨q increases with congestion and
eventually reaches k✓ ´ 1, such that no test should be performed when x • 26.
More generally, Proposition 2 implies that the overall maximum number of customers
allowed in the system is achieved when k “ k✓ ´ 1 or k “ k✓. Note further that, since
k always increases for a customer in service, in steady state, threshold kp¨q can only be
reached with a customer arrival, that is, threshold kp¨q is always crossed from the left-hand
side, and never from above. As a result, an alternative way of presenting the optimal
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Policy for a One Sided Diagnostic System with Congestion
p0 “ 0.3,  k “ 0.5 for all k • 0, ⇢ “ 0.1, v¯ “ 100, v “ 500, c¯ “ c “ 0, cwpxq “ x.
structure is through the threshold x¯pkq. That is, the agent should first let the maximum
level of congestion allowed in the system increase with the number of performed tests. Only
when enough tests have been run should the maximum number of customers in the system
decrease. This structure highlights the distinction between our result and the commonly
seen monotone threshold results in the existing queuing control literature.
The structure of the policy also retains the observation made in Section 2.3 that the
service provider may make a diagnose against the test results. For one-sided tests, she may
interrupt the search and identify the customer as type ⌧ even though all test results thus
far are positive. This never occurs in systems without congestion. With congestion, this
can only occur in the one sided case when the congestion level increases over the threshold
during the elicitation of the first few tests (i.e. as long as k † k✓). On the other hand, if
type ⌧¯ base rate is high enough (i.e. p0 • ✓), the service provider never makes a diagnose
against the test results, as stated by the following proposition which directly follows from
Proposition 2 and the definition of k✓,
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Proposition 3. Assume that  k is nonincreasing in k. The optimal policy for one-sided
systems is fully characterized by nonincreasing thresholds k¯pxq if and only if p0 • ✓. In
this case, the agent performs an additional test if k † k¯pxq and identifies the customer as
type ⌧¯ otherwise.
In other words, when the base rate is is large enough, the management of one-side
diagnostic services under congestion is consistent with insights from systems without con-
gestion (the service providers never makes a diagnose against the test results, see Appendix
A.3) and from the existing queueing litterature (the optimal policy is characterized by one
monotone threshold, see Hopp et al. 2007). When p0 † ✓, however, managing diagnostics
systems with congestion becomes significantly di↵erent.
2.5 E↵ect of Base Rate p0
In this section, we explore further the impact of base rate p0. This allows deriving addi-
tional insights into the e↵ect of congestion on the management of diagnostic services. In
particular, the insights of this section disappear in systems with no congestion, i.e., when
there is ample service capacity such that arriving customers always find an available server.
More precisely, we are interested in exploring how the optimal search intervals react to
changes in p0. In a system without congestion, belief probability p is a su cient statistic,
and thus past test results, as well as p’s initial value p0, do not a↵ect the optimal deci-
sion (see Appendix A.3, Proposition 10 for a formal proof). In diagnostic services with
congestion, however, base rate p0 reflects the service provider’s belief about the types of
customers waiting in queue. This influences the decision on whether to continue the cur-
rent diagnostic process, or stop and start a new search on the next customer in line. Thus,
the optimal policy of a diagnostic service with congestion should change with base rate p0.
(This can also be seen from Optimality Equation (2.5).)
Our numerical study reveals that the optimal search interval shrinks as p0 moves closer
to ✓. Figure 2.3 depicts the optimal thresholds for a system with identical and symmetrical
tests where ↵k “  k “ 0.6 for all k, for two values of p0. Note that because tests are
identical, the optimal thresholds do not depend on k (see Section 2.3). The solid thresholds
correspond to the optimal rule when the base rate is equal to pa0 “ 0.6. The dashed
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Policy for pa0 “ 0.6 (solid thresholds) and pb0 “ 0.5 (dashed
thresholds)
↵k “  k “ 0.6, for all k, ⇢ “ 0.2, v¯ “ 700, v “ 550, c¯ “ c “ 0, cwpxq “ x.
thresholds represent the optimal thresholds when the base rate equals pb0 “ 0.5. For this
example ✓ “ 0.44 so that pb0 is closer to ✓ than pa0 (i.e. ✓ † pb0 † pa0).6 As it is evident
from Figure 2.3, the dashed thresholds are within the solid thresholds. In other words, the
search intervals shrink as p0 approaches ✓.
To investigate the intuition behind this phenomenon, consider state, for example, px “
20, p “ 0.4q for both systems in Figure 2.3. The service provider faces the tradeo↵
between running an additional test on the current customer, or stopping the search and
starting diagnosing the next available customer. The service provider’s belief about the
current customer is the same (p “ 0.4) in both systems. As a result, the expected value of
performing an additional test is the same in both systems. However, her belief about the
6 In general, the posterior probabilities and hence the dots in Figure 2.3 should not be the same for
di↵erent base rates. They coincide in our example because the tests are identical and symmetrical,
and since we choose pb0 “ 0.5 “ ⇡´k p0.6q “ ⇡´k ppa0q.
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next customer type is equal to 0.6 and 0.5 in systems a) and b), respectively. Thus, the
values of starting diagnosing the next customer in line di↵er in the two systems. As base
rate p0 gets closer to ✓ from pa0 to p
b
0, the next customer type becomes more ambiguous.
As a result, the marginal benefit of starting the search on a new customer increases. This
explains why at state px “ 20, p “ 0.4q, continuing the process for the current customer
is optimal when base rate is pa0 “ 0.6, while starting the process on the next customer in
line becomes optimal when pb0 “ 0.5.
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Figure 2.4: Search Interval for x “ 2 as a Function of p0
↵k “  k “ 0.6, ⇢ “ 0.2, v¯ “ 700, v “ 550, c¯ “ c “ 0, cwpxq “ x.
More generally, at a given state px, pq, when the decision of stopping the search and
stating the next diagnose is optimal for a given value of p0, the decision remains optimal
for values of p0 that are closer to ✓. Consequently, the optimal search interval shrinks.
This is further illustrated by Figure 2.4, in which the congestion level is fixed at x “ 2,
and p0 takes di↵erent values.7 The vertical axis corresponds to p0, while the horizontal one
represents belief probability p. For a given p0, each dot indicates states px “ 2, pq in which
7 The values of p0 correspond to the di↵erent posterior probabilities determined by Bayes’ rules
(2.1-2.2), starting from p0 “ 0.5.
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Table 2.1: Model Parameters for the Numerical Study
Parameters Uniform Distribution
⇢ r0.1, 0.6s
c` v r10, 700s
↵k,  k r0.5, 0.8s for k “ 1, . . . , 5
✓ r0.1, 0.9s
pa0 r0.1, 0.9s
pb0 rp10, ✓s or r✓, p10s
the service provider continues the search. The left and right hand side triangles denote the
states where the service provider stops the search and diagnoses the customer as type ⌧
and ⌧¯ , respectively. As p0 increases from 0 to ✓ the optimal search interval shrinks. But
as p0 continues to increase and moves away from ✓, the interval expands again.8
This observation is not limited to systems with identical and symmetrical tests. We
have run a large scale numerical study with model parameters randomly generated from
uniform distributions according to intervals listed in Table 2.1. In total we generated 106
cases. For all tested cases, we find that given any two systems a) and b) which di↵er only
in their base rates where pa0 ° pb0 ° ✓ or pa0 † pb0 † ✓, there exist thresholds p¯apx, kq,
papx, kq, p¯bpx, kq, and pbpx, kq such that papx, kq † pbpx, kq † ✓ † p¯bpx, kq † p¯apx, kq for all
state px, kq.
2.6 Conclusion
This work is the first to study how to dynamically perform diagnosis under time pressure in
the form of congestion. We formulate this problem as a Partially Observable Markov Deci-
sion Process and demonstrate that the service provider should perform additional tests as
long as her subjective probability belongs to a given interval, the length of which decreases
as congestion intensifies. This structure reveals several important aspects of managing di-
agnostic services under congestion, which significantly di↵er from more established search
problems with no congestion.
8 Figure 2.4 does not imply that more tests are conducted to each customer with p0 farther away
from ✓. The accuracy/congestion tradeo↵ may cause more or fewer tests conducted on a customer
in steady state as p0 gets closer to ✓.
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First, diagnostic processes where tasks do not accumulate can be designed without
knowledge of base rate p0. This is not true anymore for congested diagnostic services. This
means, for instance, that a medical diagnostic process needs to account for the population
of patients it serves, and track changes in the base rate of the searched type. In particular,
our numerical analysis suggests that the search interval should shrinks as p0 approaches ✓.
Second, because of congestion e↵ects, the agent should sometimes stop the diagnostic
process and make a diagnose against the latest test result. In the one sided case, this
means that the agent can identify the customer as a given type even though all test results
have indicated otherwise. Decisions like these never occur in diagnostic systems with no
congestion.
Finally, we find that in the one sided case, the agent should first let the maximum level
of congestion allowed in the system increase with the number of performed tests. Only
when enough tests have been run should the maximum number of customers in the system
decrease.
From a more technical point of view, some of our assumptions can actually be relaxed.
In particular, Proposition 2 for the one-sided case holds under more general conditions.
Specifically, two monotone thresholds are also optimal when µk kp1´ pkq is nonincreasing
in k, with test-dependent rate µk. This, however, requires a very di↵erent proof than the
one o↵ered in this paper, which does not directly extend to the two sided asymmetrical
case. Another point worth mentioning is what happens when the test elicitation times
are not exponentially distributed. In general, this requires expanding the state space to
include the time elapsed since the last event. However, if decisions are only made when a
new customer arrives or a test is completed, the system can be cast into a discrete time
format similar to our model (see Bertsekas 2007b, Chapter 5). In this case, we believe that
most of our insights continue to hold.
Other natural extensions of our system should further help explore many other ques-
tions related to forming judgements under congestion. For instance, the diagnostic process
could include non-homogeneous costs of performing tests. Multi-server systems are also
relevant as they may shed light on sta ng rules for diagnostic services. In addition, agents
may be in charge of both making the diagnosis and taking follow-up actions, which would
raise the design problem of striking the right balance between providing the diagnostic and
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subsequent services. These extensions, however, may not always yield tractable models. A
fruitful direction may consist in exploring simple heuristics that perform well.
Finally, our approach constitutes a very promising framework for understanding how
individuals make actual decisions when tasks can accumulate. In fact, a similar diagnostic
process without congestion have been proposed to represent how individuals decide (Buse-
meyer and Rapoport 1988). Psychologists have long recognized the importance of time
pressure in human decision making. However, the cognitive environments psychologists
consider are not typical of service organizations. In particular, situations where time pres-
sure takes the form of accumulation of tasks have systematically been ignored. Our model
naturally lends itself to experimental studies. Our results also o↵er a normative benchmark
against which performances can be compared.
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3Dismissing Decision Tasks:
The Optimality of theM–Shaped Structure
We consider a sequential hypothesis-testing problem where the Decision Maker (DM) faces
a random stream of decision tasks that accumulate over time, creating congestion. As in the
classical set-up, the agent needs to dynamically choose when to terminate the information
collection process and make a final decision. In our set-up, however, unattended tasks
accumulate in a queue and incur additional delay-related costs. This gives the DM an
incentive to dismiss tasks from the queue, in the sense that the DM makes her decision a
priori without running any test. In this chapter, we examine when it is desirable to dismiss
decision tasks such as these. To that end, we model the problem as a Partially Observed
Markov Decision Process and fully characterize the optimal policy which maximizes the
long-run average profit. Our analysis reveals the optimality of anM-shaped structure. This
structure implies that dismissing tasks can mitigate ine ciencies in the decision process
that have been reported in the literature.
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3.1 Introduction
Sequential hypothesis-testing is concerned with situations where the Decision Maker (DM)
performs tests (e.g., sampling) sequentially prior to making a terminal decision about
the prevailing state of the world. The DM’s main objective, therefore, is to dynamically
balance the cost of eliciting additional information against the benefit of improving the
accuracy of her decision. The study of sequential hypothesis-testing problems dates back
to DeGroot (1970), and has provided the foundation for various decision analysis models,
from technology adoption (McCardle 1985) to commitment decisions on influenza vaccine
composition (Kornish and Keeney 2008). Despite the large literature on how to perform a
single decision task in this setting, little is known about the DM’s optimal strategy when
she faces a stream of arriving tasks, which accumulate until they are attended to and
create time pressure in the form of congestion. Accordingly, the cost of eliciting additional
information depends on the size of the accumulated workload. As a result, the DM will
sometimes has an incentive to dismiss tasks from the system, in the sense that she makes
an a priori decision, without spending any time searching for information.
The objective of this chapter is to determine how the DM should make dismissing
decisions such as these. To that end, we consider a simple setup based on Chapter 2, where
the DM faces a stream of decision tasks. Each task is either in state s or in its complement,
state s¯. The DM does not know the state, and sequentially observes binary (positive or
negative) signals produced by imperfect and identical tests. The DM’s subjective belief
about the current task’s actual state is fully captured by the intensity of preference, which is
defined as the di↵erence between the number of positive and negative test results. Arriving
tasks accumulate in a queue, and the DM needs to decide (i) when to stop the search on
the current task and (ii) whether or not to dismiss some of the tasks from the queue in
order to manage the size of the accumulated workload.
We formulate this problem as a Markov Decision Process with the objective of maxi-
mizing the long-run average value. The state of the system is two-dimensional and consists
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of the number of tasks awaiting completion (n) and the DM’s intensity of preference (d).
We characterize the structure of the optimal policy, which takes the form of two nested
intervals on the DM’s intensity of preference. More specifically, the DM should continue to
collect observations for the current task as long as d falls into a search interval (we call it
the Outer Interval). When, however, d falls into the dismiss interval (the Inner Interval),
gathering additional observation for the current task must be preceded by removing some
unprocessed tasks from the system. Furthermore, the Outer Interval shrinks as congestion
intensifies whereas the Inner Interval expands with workload size. This means that the
optimal policy possesses anM-shaped structure in the pn, dq space.
Our analysis extends the model proposed in Chapter 2, in the case of identical and
symmetrical tests, by allowing the DM to dismiss some decision tasks. In Chapter 2,
tasks also accumulate but cannot be dismissed from the queue without processing. The
corresponding optimal policy is characterized by a search interval that shrinks as congestion
intensifies. This structure also implies that when congestion intensifies, the DM may
sometimes interrupt the current task’s search process and make a choice that goes against
the information that has been collected thus far. For example, the DM should sometimes
decide state s¯ for a task, even though d is positive. This e↵ect imposes an undesirable
ine ciency, as the DM sometimes needs to incur the cost of collecting information, which
she subsequently has to ignore. By contrast, our analysis reveals that allowing the DM
to dismiss tasks eliminates this type of ine ciency. More generally, we show that the
structure of a search interval needs to be augmented by a dismissal interval which expands
as congestion intensifies.
This study bears relevance to the considerable body of work on admission control in the
queueing literature (see Glazebrook et al. 2009; Deo and Gurvich 2011; Lin and Ross 2003;
Ormeci and Burnetas 2004; Turhan et al. 2012; Cui et al. 2009; Yildirim and Hasenbein
2010 for recent works in this field; also see Shmueli et al. 2003; Song-Hee et al. 2013 for
empirical studies of admission decisions at hospital ICUs). This chapter, however, appears
to be the first one to consider an admission control problem when the service consists in
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making a sequential decision. Further, the decision task we study naturally corresponds to
a diagnostic service in a healthcare setting, and our work is also related to recent models
of triage nurses (see, for example, Argon and Ziya 2009; Dobson and Sainathan 2011;
Shumsky and Pinker 2003; Lee et al. 2012). The main focus of our model in this context
is on the initial triage (the gatekeeper or router) where patient’s needs may need to be
determined with varying levels of accuracy (including no information gathering at all).
On the other hand, we account for the costs of the subsequent treatments in expectation
instead of dynamically.
This chapter is also related to a stream of research which studies the general problems
of balancing congestion against the value o↵ered to the customers (see in particular Hopp
et al. 2007; Bouns 2003; George and Harrison 2001). In this framework, the value provided
to the customer is captured by an increasing function of the service time. By contrast, the
service process in our set-up corresponds to a sequential testing problem. This alteration,
however, yields di↵erent results and insights (Alizamir, de Ve´ricourt, and Sun 2013).
The remainder of this chapter is as follows: We describe the model in the next section.
Characterization of the optimal policy and all analytical results are presented in Section
3.3. The conclusion is provided in Section 3.4.
3.2 Model Formulation
We consider a DM to whom tasks arrive randomly over time, according to a Poisson process
with rate  , and are accumulated in a queue until they are processed. Each task is either
in state s or in its complement, s¯, which is unknown to the DM a priori. The collectable
observations are the binary signals produced by a sequence of imperfect and identical tests,
so that a positive (resp. negative) signal supports state s (resp. s¯). The time required to
run a test (or collect a sample) is exponentially distributed with rate µ, and the process is
preemptive so that a test can be stopped at any time.
The DM assigns prior probability p0 to each arriving task being in state s, which is
revised in process after each observation is gathered. Tests are symmetrical in the sense
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that the conditional probability of a positive outcome given state s equals the conditional
probability of a negative outcome given state s¯, and is denoted by   ° 0.5. We define the
intensity of preference, d, as the di↵erence between the number of positive and negative
signals obtained thus far. Note that d is a su cient statistic assuming the DM has access
to infinite number of identical and symmetrical tests. We therefore denote pd to represent
the DM’s subjective belief about the task in process being in state s when the intensity of
preference equals d. If an additional observation is collected at this point, Bayes’ rule is
applied to update the subjective belief as
Pr ts|d,`u “ pd`1 “  pd pd ` p1´  qp1´ pdq , Pr ts|d,´u “ pd´1 “
p1´  qpd
p1´  qpd `  p1´ pdq ,
for a positive and negative signal, respectively.
Correct decisions generate value and incorrect decisions incur losses. We do not assume
the value and cost structure to be symmetric. In particular, correctly determining that a
task is in state s (resp. s¯) generates value v (resp. v¯) whereas a wrong judgment about its
state imposes the loss c (resp. c¯). Moreover, the delay penalty wpnq is incurred per unit
time if there are n tasks accumulated in the workload. In connection with two-level service
processes, these parameters implicitly include the value/cost of the subsequent treatments,
which depend on the accuracy of the diagnosis by the gatekeeper.
If the DM decides to stop and commit to a terminal decision on the current task when
the intensity of preference is d, her expected reward becomes
rppdq “ pdv ´ p1´ pdqc¯, and r¯ppdq “ p1´ pdqv¯ ´ pdc,
for favoring states s and s¯, respectively. It follows immediately that state s is preferable
over state s¯ if pd exceeds the critical fraction
✓ “ v¯ ` c¯
v ` c` v¯ ` c¯ ,
and state s¯ is favored otherwise. Without loss of generality, we assume that p0 † ✓, and
normalize r¯pp0q to equal zero. Further, we can define d✓ as the largest d for which it
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is better to favor state s¯, that is d✓ “ max td; pd † ✓u. As d approaches d✓, the DM is
increasingly indi↵erent between either alternatives.
3.3 Analysis and Results
The optimal policy must determine, at any point in time, the best action among the
following four options: (i) terminate testing on the current task and identify state s, (ii)
terminate testing on the current task and identify state s¯, (iii) acquire at least one more
observation on the current task before committing to any decision, (iv) reduce the size of
the accumulated workload by dismissing a task from the queue (which should be identified
as in state s¯ since p0 † ✓). The performance of a policy is evaluated as the long-run average
profit, which includes reward for correct decisions and penalties for misidentifications and
delays.
We formulate the problem as a Markov Decision Process where the state of the system
is given by pn, dq, the number of tasks awaiting completion and the intensity of preference
for the task in process. As mentioned before, this is because d provides a su cient statistic
for all the observed signals thus far. We assume, without loss of generality, that  `µ “ 1,
and apply uniformization to obtain the corresponding Bellman’s equation as,
g ` Jpn, dq “ max
!
´ wpnq `  Jpn` 1, dq ` µ` pd ` p1´  qp1´ pdq˘J`n, d` 1˘
`µ`p1´  qpd `  p1´ pdq˘J`n, d´ 1˘,
g ` rppdq ` Jpn´ 1, 0q,
g ` r¯ppdq ` Jpn´ 1, 0q,
g ` Jpn´ 1, dq
)
, for n • 1 and any d, (3.1)
g ` Jp0, 0q “  Jp1, 0q ` µJp0, 0q,
where g represents the long-run average profit, and Jp., .q is the bias function.
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The characterization of the optimal policy is quite involved and follows the steps out-
lined in the appendix. This leads to the following result,
Theorem 2. For any given n, there exists intervals pd¯pnq, dpnqq and pdˆpnq, dˇpnqq so that
d¯pnq § dˆpnq § d✓ † dˇpnq § dpnq. When the system is at state pn, dq, it is optimal to
• terminate testing in favor of state s¯ if d § d¯pnq,
• terminate testing in favor of state s if d • dpnq,
• dismiss a task from the queue if dˆpnq † d † dˇpnq, and
• continue testing on the current task otherwise.
Hence, for any fixed queue size, the optimal policy takes the form of two nested intervals
on the intensity of preference, where the outer interval (search interval) determines the
continuation of the process on the current task and the inner interval (dismiss interval)
regulates the adjustment of the workload by dismissing unprocessed tasks from the queue.
The next result shows how these thresholds vary with n.
Theorem 3. Thresholds d¯pnq and dˇpnq increase in n, whereas thresholds dˆpnq and dpnq
decrease with n.
To derive the above results, we have to first consider the corresponding total discounted
profit model and obtain the structural properties of the value function. The proof approach
includes subtle use of value iteration and sample path arguments. We can then use SEN
Conditions (Sennott 1999) to extend the results to the long-run average profit model.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the optimal policy in the pn, dq space for a numerical example. The
upward (resp. downward) triangles are the states for which making the terminal decision in
favor of s (resp. s¯) is optimal. The triangles facing the d-axis, on the other hand, represent
the states that correspond to dismissing a task from the queue. Continue observation
collection on the current task is optimal for the states depicted by dots. The optimal
policy implies that terminal decision on the task has to be made only if the magnitude of
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Optimal Policy for a Numerical Example
⇢ “  {µ “ 0.1, p0 “ 0.3,   “ 0.6, v “ 1600, v¯ “ 2000, c “ c¯ “ 0, wpnq “ n.
d is large enough, i.e., certainty about its state is su ciently high. On the other hand,
at higher levels of ambiguity on the current task (d being close to d✓), the optimal policy
may prescribe dismissing a task from the workload because a long processing time on the
current task is expected. Furthermore, as the size of the workload grows, the DM has two
di↵erent levers to mitigate high delay penalties. She can reduce n by either removing the
current task in service while possibly sacrificing its accuracy, or dismiss a task from the
queue. Theorem 3 implies that both of these levers are exploited as congestion intensifies,
so that the search and dismiss intervals shrink and expand, respectively, with congestion.
Note that dismissing a task does not mean that the task is disregarded but rather that the
decision is taken upfront. In a medical diagnostic setting, for example, this may mean that
an arriving patient is treated as sick upon arrival without any diagnosis, when the triage
nurse is overwhelmed.
An alternative representation of the optimal policy is in terms of thresholds on the
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maximum number of tasks allowed in the system. Then, the optimal policy can be described
as thresholds n¯pdq so that when the intensity of preference is d, it is optimal to continue the
process if n † n¯pdq, and to release a task otherwise. The task which has to be dismissed in
this case is either the task in process or a task from the queue depending on the value of
d. With this interpretation, the threshold n¯pdq demonstrates anM-shaped structure in d.
Finally, the optimal policy in our setting provides a remedy for an undesirable ine -
ciency described in Chapter 2, where tasks must be released in order of their arrivals. More
specifically, with dismissing decisions, the DM never commits to a terminal decision that
is against what the gathered information suggests. This is formally stated in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. When dismissing tasks from the queue is allowed, the DM never commits
to a terminal decision which is against the obtained information. In particular, it is never
optimal to stop the process and choose state s¯ (reps. s) for the current task when d ° 0
(reps. d † 0).
This is because when d ° 0, the DM is always better o↵ dismissing a task from the
queue (by choosing s¯) instead of terminating the search process on the current one, should
she release a task due to high congestion.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we employ a simple paradigm to study dismissing decisions for a sequential
hypothesis testing problem where tasks accumulate. The DM gathers information on each
task, by performing a sequence of identical and symmetrical tests, prior to committing to
a terminal decision. We show that the optimal policy in this setting can be characterized
by two nested intervals so that the outer interval determines the treatment of the current
task and the inner interval regulates the dismissing decisions as congestion intensifies.
Furthermore, the former shrinks whereas the latter expands with workload size. Finally, we
show that the flexibility of dismissing tasks from the workload eliminates the ine ciency
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identified in Chapter 2, by which the DM sometimes need to make choices against the
gathered information.
Our assumption of identical tests allows us to model the DM’s belief as her intensity
of preference. This corresponds to situations where each test is a new sample from the
same population, which applies to many practical applications (e.g., quality inspection; see
Chapter 2 for more detail). This is also in parallel to the sequential decision making
literature where an unknown state of nature is responsible for producing independent
and identically distributed observations (see Rapoport and Burkheimer 1971 for one of
the first works following this approach). The symmetry requirement on tests has also
been dominant in previous research on psychological models of deferred decision making
(Busemeyer and Rapoport 1988; Edwards 1965). On the other hand, further research is
needed to explore the optimal policy when tests are not identical. The problem becomes a
three dimensional Markov Decision Process and is therefore significantly more challenging.
Another interesting extension is when the DM needs also to dynamically determine the
order of the tests. Finally, building on the aforementioned psychology literature, we believe
our approach constitutes a very promising framework for understanding how individuals
make actual dismissal decisions such as those studied in this chapter, when tasks can
accumulate.
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4E cient Feed-In-Tari↵ Policies
for Renewable Energy Technologies
Feed-in-tari↵ (FIT) policies aim at driving down the cost of renewable energies by foster-
ing learning and accelerating the di↵usion of green technologies. Under FIT mechanisms,
governments purchase green energy at tari↵s that are set above market price. The success
or failure of FIT policies, in turn, critically depend on how these tari↵s are determined
and adjusted over time. This study provides insights and guidance into designing e↵ec-
tive and cost-e cient FIT programs such as these. To that end, we propose a dynamic
optimization modeling framework that captures the key network externalities contributing
to the technology evolution path. We show in our framework that the investments’ prof-
itability guaranteed by the tari↵s should either always increase or always decrease as time
progresses. This is in contrast with the current practice of FIT-implementing jurisdictions
which typically try to maintain the same level of profitability across the policy horizon.
Further, we determine how the structure of the optimal policy (ascending vs. descending
profitability) changes with technology and market characteristics as well as with the policy
objectives. In particular, when the policy horizon is endogenous and the policy goal is a
target on the technology cost reduction, our results reveal that the investors’ profitability
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should decrease (resp. increase) over time for low (reps. high) values of learning rates or
penetration speeds. We also demonstrate that the annual capacity installation should not
always increase over time as existing FIT implementations sometime suggest.
4.1 Introduction
Feed-in-tari↵s (FITs) are policy instruments that attract investments in renewable energy
by setting a long-term guaranteed purchase agreement for green power producers to sell
their electricity into the grid (Klein 2008; Mendonca et al. 2009). Among existing policy
mechanisms to stimulate the deployment of green energy, FIT policies are the most widely
implemented and have proven to be the most promising of all, accounting for a bigger share
of renewable energy dispersion than any other support scheme (European Commission
2008; Fouquet and Johansson 2008; Mendonca et al. 2009). As of 2011, FIT laws are in
place in more than 87 jurisdictions across the world (REN21 2011), and are responsible for
approximately 75% of worldwide solar photovoltaic (PV) and 45% of global wind energy
deployment (Deutsche Bank 2010).
Nonetheless, the implementation of FITs is not always successful. For instance, the
Spain’s FIT program during 2006-2008 period had to be hastily interrupted, ending with
government expenditures twenty times higher than budgeted (Deutsche Bank 2009). In-
deed, the success of FIT schemes critically depends on the tari↵s at which governments
decide to purchase green electricity, which, in turn, determine the level of profitability for
investors (Mendonca et al. 2009; Fell 2009). Overall, too aggressive tari↵s (higher levels of
profitability) attract a wider range of investors by making less e cient projects financially
viable, but put big burden on taxpayers’ shoulders. Too conservative remunerations, on
the other hand, may decelerate market expansion and limit the scope of the technology
only to those who operate very e ciently.
The goal of this chapter is to address fundamental tradeo↵s such as those encountered
by lawmakers in designing FIT policy mechanisms. More specifically, we form normative
recommendations on how to set and update feed-in compensations for a renewable energy
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technology in order to accelerate its deployment, while containing the expenditure at a
minimum level. To that end, we propose a dynamic optimization modeling framework that
captures, at a macro level, the key network externalities1 contributing to the technology
evolution path.
The eventual aspiration of a FIT policy is to drive down the cost of renewables through
technological leapfrogging and toward commercial maturity. The maturity threshold for a
renewable energy technology, often referred to as grid parity, is attained when the technol-
ogy becomes cost-competitive. Once such a threshold is transcended, market forces take
over and no further government intervention is needed. In conjunction with this ultimate
ambition, various intermediate targets may be envisioned in accordance with regulators’
priorities to underscore their political will and further incentivize societal engagement (Cou-
ture et al. 2010; Mendonca et al. 2009). These targets are typically in the form of capacity
landmarks, cost reduction thresholds, or share in total energy portfolio. For example,
France has mandated 1,100 MW of solar power (PV and Thermal) by the end of 2012, and
5,400 MW by the end of 2020, whereas China has required its renewables to account for
a 15% share in the nation’s total energy consumption by 2020 (REN21 2011). In view of
this common practice, we study the policy design problem with cost-minimizing objective
and under two di↵erent scenarios: (i) exogenously-imposed capacity or cost targets with
binding timetables, and (ii) endogenously-induced policy horizon with grid-parity goal.
Our model also captures the two main network e↵ects that FIT schemes leverage on,
which together drive the dynamics of technology evolution over time: (i) technological
learning, and (ii) di↵usion process. Technological progress, which takes place as a result of
knowledge accumulation, competition, and economy of scale, introduces the most promi-
nent market trend and the primary rationale for dynamic control of feed-in prices. The
decline in technology cost as a function of its proliferation builds on a well-known concept
in economics literature which is interchangeably referred to as experience curve, learning
1 We use terms “network externalities”, “network e↵ects”, or “market dynamics” exchangeably in
this chapter to refer to impacts that the current users of the technology have on the future ones.
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curve or learning-by-doing, and was formalized by the seminal work of Arrow (1962) (see
also Yelle 1979). This e↵ect was later adopted in energy economics to describe cost-cutting
trends in energy technologies (see, for example, International Energy Agency 2000; Mc-
Donald and Schrattenholzer 2001; Klein 2008). The notion of learning-by-doing is based
on the observation that for every doubling of production size (or output), the cost of tech-
nology tends to drop by a certain percentage, formally characterized as learning rate (Yelle
1979).2
The way investors react to an incentive policy also hinges heavily on society’s awareness
of the new technology and the perception of its future outlook (see Jager 2006), which forms
a second major dynamic swaying market conditions. The spread of information about a
new technology or product in the market is governed by social learning, and is formally
referred to as di↵usion process in the marketing literature (Bass 1969; Mahajan et al.
1990). This notion reflects on the fact that further penetration of a new technology in
the society enhances public consciousness about its value, which, in turn, creates a larger
potential demand (see Geroski 2000 and Rao and Kishore 2010 for more on the penetration
pattern of a new technology).
To track and encourage technological improvements and maintain the market-contingency
of the policy over time, FIT levels are often amended downward for installations in subse-
quent years (Fell 2009; Klein et al. 2010; Couture et al. 2010; de Ve´ricourt and Munigowda
2012). Tari↵ degressions such as these are usually performed periodically. In most cases,
feed-in prices fall annually by a fixed percentage, and the new rates are in e↵ect for projects
that are becoming operational within that timeframe.3 For example, Germany applies an
annual degression schedule for renewable energy technologies which depends on the level
of the technology maturity and ranges from 1% (e.g. for onshore wind) to 10% (e.g. for
2 Progress ratio, defined as (1-learning rate) provides an alternative representation for technological
learning.
3 In a more recent development, some countries supplement their periodic degression schedule
with a more advanced mechanism called responsive (or corridor) degression in order to make it
more contingent on the pace of market growth (Couture et al. 2010; Germany RES Act 2008).
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solar PV) (Germany RES Act 2008).
Regardless of the financial yardstick in use for investment appraisal (e.g. rate of re-
turn, profitability index, etc.), legislators typically attempt to maintain the same level of
profitability across years by dynamically fine-tuning tari↵s o↵ered to newly-commissioned
projects. For instance, a 2010 report by UK’s Department of Energy and Climate Change
states (UK DECC 2010): “Accordingly, the tari↵s that are available for new installations
will degress each year, where they reduce to reflect predicted technology cost reductions to
ensure that new installations receive the same approximate rates of return as installations
already supported through FITs.” Depending on the technology, the intended rates of return
lie in the 5%-8% range for UK (UK DECC 2010) and degressions are exerted to retain this
nominal yield in consideration of cost realities. The Germany’s Renewable Energy Source
Act is established based on an approximate 7% rate of return for well-operated installations
(Fell 2009). Profit margins in France relies, in a similar manner, on profitability index, de-
fined as the ratio between project’s overall discounted payo↵ and its total discounted cost
(Mendonca et al. 2009).
Our analysis reveals that, it is often suboptimal to uphold the same level of profitability
for installations in subsequent years. In an environment where market demand is governed
by learning and di↵usion e↵ects, it is optimal for the administration to deliver profits which
are monotonically increasing or decreasing throughout the policy horizon. This finding calls
for compensations to be progressively pegged to generation costs in a specific manner, so
that the yield on investment in the technology consistently moves upward or downward over
time. In our set-up, profitability index (PI) keeps track of investors’ surplus and o↵ers a
simple representation of the results. That is, the optimal PI schedule exhibits a monotonic
pattern, an ascending-PI or descending-PI policy (API or DPI, respectively), the direction
of which is determined by technology and market characteristics. By contrast, current FIT
practices adjust the tari↵s over time such as to keep PI (or equivalently the rate of return)
constant over time.
Intuitively, our API policy sets the e ciency-breakpoints tight in early periods and
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moderates them gradually as time progresses. This has the advantage of funding only
e cient projects early on and at low cost, while utilizing their learning and di↵usion
e↵ects for the subsequent years. Also, the policy postpones bigger expenditures to later
periods which can be valuable due to discounting. Nevertheless, conservative payments
at the early stages also imply slower growth and a smaller pool of e cient investors in
the future. A DPI policy, on the other hand, o↵ers aggressive tari↵s at the outset which
bears mobilizing some less-e cient investments and over-compensating the very e cient
ones. The vigorous growth of the technology in the early periods, however, has learning
and di↵usion implications which come into benefit as PI starts to decrease.
The direction of monotonicity in the optimal PI schedule depends on the underlying
technology and market characteristics, and the regulatory landscape surrounding it. In
particular, we show how the optimal strategy varies as a function of technological learning
rate, penetration speed, and the way policy goals are laid out. When a capacity landmark
is set to be reached within a time limit, the model reveals that high or low learning rates
lead to an API policy, while moderate values of learning rates give rise to a DPI policy. If
capacity targets are replaced with cost milestones, this result reduces to a structure where
higher learning rates entail API and lower rates entail DPI strategies. When the technology
is not close to maturity, similar result holds for the penetration speed, so that strong (resp.
weak) penetration corresponds to an API (resp. DPI) policy. Further, under some fairly
non-restrictive assumptions, all these results are extendable to the situation where no time
window is enforced and the policy horizon is configured endogenously. These findings also
speak to FIT implementation failures, such as Spain’s experience where underestimation of
market penetration capabilities led to excessive payments and stimulated a rapid growth
without driving adequate cost improvements.
Finally, while the profitability index should always be monotone in time, the same is
not necessarily true for the number of new installations that are periodically added to the
system. Evidences from growth pattern in FIT-adopting countries, however, suggest that
governments intend to increase the annual capacity installation over time. For example,
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solar PV capacity expansion in Germany exhibits an exponential growth since 1990 (AGEE
Stat 2012). By contrast, our results state that under DPI strategies, the added capacity
can be decreasing across periods.
The area of sustainability in the OM literature has been very active over the past few
years (see Kleindorfer et al. 2005 for a review of earlier works). Government regulations
have been studied in connection with supply chain coordination (Ovchinnikov and Raz
2012; Arifoglu et al. 2012; Mamani et al. 2011), new product design and recyclability
(Plambeck and Wang 2009; Atasu et al. 2009), and carbon footprint abatement (Benjaafar
et al. 2010), among others. However, there are not too many papers that specifically deal
with policy design questions in relation with technological adoption. Krass et al. (2012)
address the impact of environmental taxation, subsidy and rebate tools on green technology
adoption by a monopolistic firm, and the corresponding social welfare implications. Drake
(2011) analyzes the e↵ect of carbon tari↵s on technology choice decisions for domestic and
foreign firms in an asymmetrically regulated environment. Aflaki and Netessine (2011)
highlight the importance of supply intermittency in renewable capacity investment. Drake
et al. (2012) study emission regulations such as tax and cap-and-trade and their influence
on technology choice and capacity decisions by firms in a newsvendor setting.
The recent working paper by Lobel and Perakis (2011) is the closet to this work. They
develop a model for solar PV adoption which includes both learning-by-doing and di↵usion
dynamics. They show convexity properties and suggest based on their analysis that FITs
in Germany should be adjusted. By contrast, here we focus on characterizing the structure
of the optimal FIT schedule and how it is impacted by technology as well as market
characteristics. Further, they assume that investors are homogenous in terms of their
solar yield and the policy target is on capacity with an exogenous time limit. Our model
addresses these concerns by accounting for investors’ e ciency spread and endogenizing
the policy horizon. Shrimali and Baker (2012) also explore the optimal design of FITs
in a two period model where di↵usion dynamic is absent and target is set on technology
cost. They distinguish between two primary drivers of decline in cost: learning-by-doing
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and economy of scale. Depending on which basis is in consideration for cost reduction and
how stringent the cost target is, they identify the periods in which the subsidy has to be
provided as well as its magnitude.
In a more broader perspective, this chapter also relates to the extensive body of liter-
ature on revenue management and dynamic pricing (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004). Gen-
erally speaking, we use price adjustments to control demand over time, when demand is
deterministic and customers (investors) are myopic. However, the main divergence (and
complication) here arises from the fact that demand in di↵erent periods are interconnected
through network externalities, factors which are typically absent in dynamic pricing mod-
els. In the marketing literature, dynamic pricing of a new product or innovation in the
presence of network e↵ects has received a great deal of attention (see Krishnan et al. 1999
for a review, and Kalish and Lilien 1983 for an early study of subsidies for alternative
energy innovations).
In the reminder of this chapter, we describe the model in Section 4.2. Analytical results
on the structure of the optimal FIT policy are derived in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 explores
the impact of technology and market characteristics on the optimal strategy. Section 4.6
concludes the chapter. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
4.2 Model Description
Consider a government which aims at boosting a renewable energy technology in its ju-
risdiction by means of a FIT program. To formulate the policy design problem faced by
lawmakers in this situation, we construct an intertemporal model of technology evolution
process, which integrates learning and di↵usion e↵ects with market responses to policy
regulations.
We assume that acquiring one unit of technology costs ct in period t, which includes
material, installation, administrative and operations costs over the project’s lifetime. For
example, ct can represent the cost of obtaining 1 kWp (kilo-Watt-peak) nominal generation
capacity of solar PV as well as the corresponding installation and maintenance costs. The
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net present value of all benefits and remunerations that an investor may collect for one
unit of technology acquired in period t is denoted by pt. So in short, ct and pt are the
lump sum cost and payo↵ to the investor, respectively, per unit of technology launched in
period t.
Under a FIT law, each year the administration o↵ers a contract which locks in a price
over a specified time-period (typically 15-25 years). Newly-installed projects are the only
ones eligible for this contract, which allows them to sell their generated electricity to the grid
at that price until the duration of their contract expires. Then, pt is the total discounted
payo↵ that a developer can retrieve over the length of the contract for her e ciently-run
unit of technology, e.g., by producing and selling 1 kW electricity per unit time. Hence, pt
is proportional to the tari↵s (or purchasing prices) enacted by the government in period t
(i.e., pt9FITt), and can be traced accordingly.
4.2.1 Investor’s Problem
A representative investor (developer) in our model is an agent who can acquire one unit
of technology and exploit it toward benefiting from FIT regulations. We associate each
individual investor with a type, which reveals her e ciency in utilizing the technology.
The type of an investor reflects any intrinsic technical or informational advantages she
may have, which enhance her capabilities in generating more value from her installation.
In particular, a type ✓ developer can collect only ✓ fraction of the maximum possible
payo↵, pt, so that ✓ P r0, 1s mirrors her distance from a fully e ciently-managed unit.
For example, investor heterogeneity for the roof-mounted solar modules may relate to the
amount of absorbed insolation which varies with the solar orientation of the house. Then,
a type ✓ investor is one who is capable of producing ✓ kW electricity per unit time from 1
kWp nominal capacity. Such an investor in period t weighs the two alternatives of adopting
the technology and thereby receiving the net payo↵ ✓pt ´ ct versus the reservation payo↵
47
of zero. Hence, she chooses to opt in if
✓pt ´ ct • 0 ô ✓ • ct
pt
. (4.1)
A developer’s type can take any value between 0 and 1, and follows distribution F p.q
with density fp.q which is positive and di↵erentiable over its support. Type ✓ “ 1 adopters
are the most e cient ones and can fetch the maximum payo↵, pt, from a unit of nomi-
nal capacity, whereas type ✓ “ 0 agents are incompetent of any technology exploitation.
We impose no restrictions on distribution F p.q except requiring it to hold the increasing
generalized failure rate (IGFR) property.4 This assumption is not restrictive at all since
many of the commonly used distributions satisfy the IGFR condition, e.g., normal, expo-
nential, gamma, Weibull and power distribution (see Lariviere and Porteus 2001 for more
discussion).
Investors are not strategic in the sense that they do not wait in anticipation of getting a
higher margin in the future. That is, a potential investment can be mobilized in the present
period if o↵ered a non-negative payo↵. This holds when investors’ time discount for the
green technology in our setting is quite steep in light of other investment opportunities.
More generally, this happens when investors are short-sighted agents who try to maximize
their utility with a myopic timeframe in mind (as in Lobel and Perakis 2011).
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Figure 4.1: Segmentation of the Market in Period t
Given this assumption and following Equation (4.1), new adoptions in period t consist
of investors of type higher than the threshold  t “ ct{pt, as depicted in Figure 1. Thus,
4 The IGFR property implies that the ratio xfpxq{p1´ F pxqq is increasing in x.
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the probability of a random investor joining the program in period t is F¯
`
 t
˘
, where
F¯ p.q “ 1´ F p.q is the complementary cumulative distribution function of investor type.
4.2.2 Market Dynamics
Our model captures the most essential dynamics contributing to the evolution of a new
technology in the marketplace. First, we borrow the notion of learning curve from the
economics literature to formalize the decline in technology cost due to expansion of its
usage. This phenomenon corresponds to the cost reductions caused by innovation, compe-
tition and economy of scale as well as improvements in knowledge, skills, techniques and
procedures.
Among several functional forms which have been proposed to represent the learning
curve, exponential decay (power function) is the most common approach (Yelle 1979; Wand
and Leuthold 2011). Under this paradigm, the technology cost drops exponentially as a
function of its widespread. In particular, the cost of acquiring one unit of technology in
period t is given by
ct “ c0
´Mt´1
M0
¯´↵
, (4.2)
where c0 and M0 are the initial cost and market size before the introduction of the FIT
bill, respectively, and Mt´1 is the cumulative installed capacity (i.e., the market size) by
the end of period t´ 1. Also, ↵ P p0, 1q is the learning parameter,5 representing the speed
at which the proliferation of the technology deflates its cost. In view of Equation (4.2),
each time the cumulative adoption of the technology doubles, its cost drops by a fixed
percentage which is known as learning rate in the literature.6 Given the monotonic one-to-
one correspondence between ↵ and learning rate, we use these two exchangeably hereafter
when we refer to the magnitude of learning.
When ↵ “ 0, there is no learning and cost remains independent of the capacity growth.
5 (´↵) is sometimes referred to as learning elasticity (van der Zwaan and Rabl 2003) or learning
index (Yelle 1979).
6 In our context, the learning rate equals to 100ˆ `1´ 2´↵˘.
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On the other hand, ↵ “ 1 describes a situation where doubling the technology penetration
cuts its cost in half. We consider ↵ to be no more than 1 in our framework, which can be
supported by available empirical evidences suggesting learning rates between 10%-30% for
renewable energy technologies (van der Zwaan and Rabl 2003).
While typical learning rates of 10%-30% have been reported for di↵erent technologies,
the rate is closer to 20% for solar PV systems (van der Zwaan and Rabl 2003; also see
Wand and Leuthold 2011; van Benthem et al. 2008; Nemet 2006 for more analysis on solar
technology learning curve). Moreover, recent studies have come to the conclusion that the
cost of electricity from wind turbines falls by 7%-19% for each twofold increase in wind
power generation capacity (Krohn et al. 2009; also see Bolinger and Wiser 2009; Junginger
et al. 2005 for more specific details on wind power technology learning curve). In a longer
time perspective, the cost of wind and solar electricity generation has dropped by more
than 50% over the last decade, which is attributable to learning e↵ects (Mendonca et al.
2009).
The second major dynamic influencing the dissemination of a new technology accounts
for network e↵ects such as word-of-mouth and spread of information, and is captured by a
di↵usion process. The demand for the technology is slim when it is first introduced to the
market. As more adoptions take place and the technology penetrates, societal awareness
about its value rises, which, in turn, generates more potential interest for the subsequent
years. We assume that each unit of existing adoption gains the attention of n uninformed
agents, which comprise the prospective demand for the next period. The penetration
coe cient, denoted by n, can be defined as the potential appeal created for the technology
in period t by each unit of operating installation. That is, n denominates the rate at which
the information about the technology spreads from adopters to non-adopters. It follows
that the potential demand for the technology in period t equals nMt´1, each of which will
be unleashed by the government’s program if it is financially viable, i.e., if its type exceeds
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 t. This implies that if payo↵ pt is o↵ered in period t, it expands the market size by
mt “ nMt´1F¯ ` t˘, (4.3)
where mt is the capacity of new installments added in this period. This quantity decreases
with  t and hence, is decreasing in technology cost ct, and increasing in payo↵ pt. The
technology dispersion evolves then in period t according to
Mt “Mt´1 `mt, (4.4)
for t “ 1, 2, . . ., where the boundary value M0 is given.
This way of modeling the di↵usion process can be regarded as a special case of the
internal influence di↵usion process (Mahajan et al. 1990) in which the ultimate potential
of the market is very large compared to its current scope.7 As a result, the di↵usion rate
is approximately proportional to present adoption breadth. It should be noted that this
approach rules out a saturation e↵ect. This modeling choice is justified in our domain,
since the fulfillment of maturity goal requires capacity landmarks which are far below
the potential market size (i.e., how large the underlying market can grow). For example,
the current installed capacity of solar PV in Germany stays under 1% of the potential
achievable size (Lobel and Perakis 2011).
In our formulation, the implicit assumption has been that e ciency composition of the
market does not change with time. That is, while the e cient segments of the potential
demand (types higher than  t) are assimilated in a period, the distribution of the investor
type remains unchanged for the succeeding period. Considering the fact that the market is
far from saturation, this assumption indicates that there are still a huge number of e cient
investors left who may be potentially interested in joining in. Therefore, the attraction of
a tiny population of e cient investors is not going to have any meaningful impact on the
general heterogeneity structure represented by F p.q.
7 In parallel to this analogy, the parameter n is equivalent to “coe cient of imitation” in Bass
(1969) model.
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4.2.3 The Government’s Problem
When designing the FIT regulations, the policymaker’s ultimate ambition is to achieve
market integration of the green technology at minimum cost. Despite this fact, most of
FIT-implementing jurisdictions incorporate various intermediate targets into their law to
show their political commitment and provide more motives for citizens’ involvement. These
targets are often set on the renewables share in total energy consumption or accumulated
generation capacity, as it is being done in most of the European Union countries (see
REN21 2011). In the context of our model, this corresponds to having a capacity target
M˜ which has to be surpassed by an exogenous deadline T .
To construct the government’s optimization problem, we note that the amount of elec-
tricity produced by a type ✓ developer is proportional to ✓. Consider period t in which
all types ✓ •  t subscribe to the program and their investments add up to mt units of
capacity (see Equation (4.3)). The total power generated by these new installations equals
mtE
“
✓
ˇˇ
✓ •  t‰ per period, and requires the overall compensation of ptmtE “✓ˇˇ✓ •  t‰ over
their contract duration. Thus, the government’s total expected expenditure for the projects
launched in this period becomes ptmtE
“
✓
ˇˇ
✓ •  t‰, and the problem can be cast as
ZpM˜, T q “ min
pt
#
Tÿ
t“1
´
 tptmtE
“
✓
ˇˇ
✓ •  t‰ ¯+ (P1)
subject to: MT • M˜ ,
where Zp., .q denotes the government’s minimum cost,   is the discount factor, and mt and
ct evolve according to Equations (4.2)-(4.4).
In light of the one-to-one correspondence between cost and capacity, as provided in
Equation (4.2), the above problem can be equivalently recast with a target on technology
cost. That is, the cost equivalent of the capacity target M˜ can be identified according to
c˜ “ c0
´ M˜
M0
¯´↵
,
and Problem (P1), with a slight abuse of notation in the first argument of function Zp., .q,
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can be rewritten as
Zpc˜, T q “ min
pt
#
Tÿ
t“1
´
 tptmtE
“
✓
ˇˇ
✓ •  t‰ ¯+ (P11)
subject to: cT`1 § c˜ .
In Section 4.4.1 where we study policy implications of di↵erent ↵ values, Problems (P1)
and (P11) are not equivalent anymore and possess di↵erent optimal solutions.
When gird parity is envisioned as the eventual objective of the FIT policy and no inter-
mediate target is introduced, the policymaker’s problem takes a di↵erent form. Grid parity
takes place when the cost of technology falls to a level where it can compete with conven-
tional power production methods without requiring any additional legislative support. In
this case, a cost target c˜˚ is in e↵ect, where c˜˚ is the threshold at which the technology
matures, i.e., it becomes self-sustainable. More specifically, c˜˚ can be interpreted as the
prevailing cost of traditional energy production powerplants such as those fueled by coal
or natural gas. We assume there is a utility ⇧ that the society enjoys per period once
this goal is fulfilled. The utility ⇧ includes the avoided negative environmental and social
externality of competing fossil fuel-based energy sources, job creation, and energy security
benefits (International Energy Agency 2011; Couture et al. 2010).
With such a social welfare at stake, there is no need to exogenously fix the duration
of the policy. In other words, the evolution trajectory of the technology must be left to
the market forces, and the target accomplishment time must be endogenized. Then, with
a slight abuse of notation by changing the arguments of the function Zp.q, the problem
converts to
Zpc˜˚q “ min
T
#
Zpc˜˚, T q ´
8ÿ
t“T`1
 t⇧
+
. (P2)
While Problems (P1) and (P2) are reflecting two distinct objective-setting practices,
they can be linked if we decompose Problem (P2) into two hierarchical steps. First, for
a given T , the period at which the technology reaches grid parity and the FIT policy
terminates, we optimize over variables pt for t “ 1, . . . , T . This is represented in Problem
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(P11), or, equivalently, Problem (P1). Then, in the second step, we solve the problem to
find the optimal T . Alternatively, Problem (P2) can be reframed in the following format
in which the two steps are solved simultaneously:
Zpc˜˚q “ min
pt
# 8ÿ
t“1
´
 tptmtE
“
✓
ˇˇ
✓ •  t‰ ¯´ ÿ
t:ct§c˜˚
 t⇧
+
.
The next section is devoted to analyzing Problems (P1) and (P2), and characterizing
their optimal solutions.
4.3 Optimal FIT Policies
We start by the two optimization problems outlined in Section 4.2.3, and derive their
corresponding optimal FITs. Then, we highlight the structural properties of these schedules
and attempt to gain insight into their policy implications.
4.3.1 Capacity Target with Fixed Policy Horizon
First consider Problem (P1). This problem echoes the current practice of governments
implementing FIT incentives. The policy sets a target on cumulative nominal capacity
with a time limit by which the capacity milestone has to be surpassed. When the policy
duration T is imposed exogenously, it may emerge as too tight for fulfillment of the desired
target. If T is very small, even o↵ering excessive tari↵s falls short in meeting the objective
because the demand size is capped in each period. In this case, we call the target infeasible.
The next lemma specifies a lower bound for T which excludes this extreme scenario.
Lemma 1. Consider the optimization Problem (P1). The target M˜ is feasible and can be
achieved in T periods if and only if T • Tmin, where Tmin is defined as
Tmin “
S
log
´
M˜
M0
¯
logpn` 1q
W
.
The notation rxs denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. The lower
bound Tmin is associated with the most extreme FIT regime, in the sense of being too
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generous. It relates to a scenario where staggering tari↵s are enacted in each period to
attract the entire potential demand.
When T in Problem (P1) exceeds Tmin, a reformulation of the dynamic optimization
enables us to establish a set of optimality equations to describe the optimal solution. To
proceed, we define function  p.q as  p.q “ `h´1 ˝ g˘p.q, where gp.q and hp.q are given by
gpxq “ `1` nF¯ pxq˘↵´1` ≥1x ✓fp✓qd✓
x2fpxq
¯
,
hpxq “  
#
np↵´ 1q ≥1x ✓fp✓qd✓
x
` `1` nF¯ pxq˘´1` ≥1x ✓fp✓qd✓
x2fpxq
¯+
.
As shown in Lemma 16 in the appendix, hp.q is decreasing and hence invertible, which
implies that  p.q is a well-defined function. The following result makes use of this function,
and shows the existence and uniqueness of the optimal sequence of ratios  t’s (defined as
ct{pt in Section 4.2.1).
Proposition 4. Consider the optimization Problem (P1), and assume that the target is
feasible. Then, there exists time period ⌧˚ • 0 such that the optimal sequence t t˚ ut“1,...,T
satisfies  t˚ “ 1 for t “ 1, . . . , ⌧˚, and  t˚`1 “  p t˚ q for t “ ⌧˚`1, . . . , T ´1. Furthermore,
this solution is unique.
Note that in Problem (P1), very large values of T legitimizes delaying the introduction
of the FIT package for a few periods due to discounting gains. When this is the case,
it is optimal to defer the start of the FIT program by o↵ering zero profit in these initial
periods. This corresponds to  t˚ “ 1 for the first ⌧˚ periods in Proposition 4. After that,
the recursive equation  t˚`1 “  p t˚ q links the profitability in two consecutive time periods.
We formalize the value of ⌧˚ in closed form in the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix.
In the proof of Proposition 4, we first reformulate the problem as a deterministic dy-
namic program in which the actions are represented in terms of periodic installments, mt’s.
We then optimize over the last period’s installation using the Envelope Theorem, which
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further reveals the optimality equation for all periods. The uniqueness of the optimal
solution follows from the structural properties of the functions gp.q and hp.q. The recur-
sive equation  t˚`1 “  p t˚ q together with the requirement that MT˚ “ M˜ provide all the
equations needed to uniquely identify the optimal schedule of pt’s.
4.3.2 Grid Parity Goal with Endogenous Policy Horizon
Now, we turn our attention to Problem (P2) and note that T “ 8 with pt “ 0 for all t
always provides a candidate solution that leads to the overall cost of zero. The situation
where such a solution is optimal corresponds to the technology being undesirable, which
happens when the policy cost of advancing it outweighs the long-term benefits. Then, it is
optimal not to pursue the technology and shut down the program right away. When this
is not the case, the optimal policy meets its goal in a finite time window by stimulating a
positive amount of investment in each period.
Lemma 2. Consider Problem (P2). There exists threshold ↵ so that the technology is
desirable if and only if ↵ • ↵, while fixing other model parameters. Similarly, thresholds
n, c¯0, and ⇧ exist so that the technology is desirable if and only if n • n, c0 § c¯0, and
⇧ • ⇧, respectively.
The implication of Lemma 2 is that a desirability frontier surface can be established in`
↵, n, c0,⇧
˘
space, dividing it into two desirable and undesirable regions. In the remainder
of this section, we focus on the case where the technology is desirable, and the structure
of the optimal policy surrounding it.
We can now present the equivalent of Proposition 4 for the case where time horizon is
endogenous.
Proposition 5. If the technology is desirable in Problem (P2), then optimal planning
horizon T ˚, is such that T ˚ • Tmin. Furthermore, the optimal ratios t t˚ ut“1,...,T˚, are
unique and satisfy  t˚`1 “  p t˚ q for t “ 1, . . . , T ˚ ´ 1.
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It is worth mentioning a distinction between Propositions 4 and 5. When time horizon
is endogenous, Proposition 5 indicates that it is never optimal to delay the implementation
of the FIT policy. That is, the profitability o↵ered in each period under the optimal policy
must be nonzero, so that  t˚ † 1 for t “ 1, 2, . . . , T ˚.
4.3.3 Structure of the Optimal FIT Schedule
The profitability index is defined in our context as ⇡t “ 1{ t “ pt{ct, which quantifies the
amount of value generated per monetary unit invested. This financial measure is commonly
used for ranking investment projects and appraising their profitability.
Theorem 4. Suppose the target is feasible in Problem (P1) or the technology is desirable
in Problem (P2). In both cases, optimal profitability indices t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T or t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚,
are monotone over the policy horizon.
Proof: In Lemma 16 in the appendix, we prove that functions gp.q and hp.q are both
decreasing. Thus, the function  p.q “ `h´1 ˝ g˘p.q is a well-defined increasing function.
When ⌧˚ “ 0, Proposition 4 implies that  t˚`1 “  p t˚ q for all t. Therefore, if  1˚ §  2˚ ,
we have  p 1˚ q §  p 2˚ q which translates into  2˚ §  3˚ . The same logic can be applied
iteratively to show that  t˚ §  t˚`1 for all t, which forms an increasing sequence of  t˚ ’s (i.e.,
a decreasing sequence of ⇡t˚ ’s). Similarly, we can deduce that  1˚ °  2˚ entails a decreasing
sequence of  t˚ ’s (i.e., an increasing sequence of ⇡t˚ ’s). Finally, if ⌧
˚ • 1, we have  t˚ “ 1
for the first ⌧˚ periods. Lemma 18 in the appendix shows that in this case, the sequence
t t˚ ut°⌧˚ is always decreasing.
According to Theorem 4, the yield o↵ered by government to investments made in the
technology in di↵erent periods should not necessarily be equal. Instead, it is optimal for
the lawmakers to either always increase or always decrease the attractiveness of such an
investment over time. This goes against current practice which typically set tari↵ levels so
as to retain the same level of profitability for projects commissioned in di↵erent years.
An alternative way of interpreting Theorem 4 elaborates on how market segmentation
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is executed under the FIT schedule. The policymaker should pursue one of the following
policy choices:
(i) Ascending profitability index (API): this mechanism starts by limiting the appeal
of the technology to very e cient investors first, and gradually invites less e cient
developers to join in later periods by making their investment financially viable.
(ii) Descending profitability index (DPI): this mechanism o↵ers more aggressive tari↵s
early on to encourage a rapid market growth, and ratchets down profitability as time
progresses to narrow the policy scope to only e cient segments of investor pool.
The tradeo↵ encountered by regulators in choosing between the two policy schemes
described above is manifold. A DPI strategy o↵ers higher profit margin in early periods to
accelerate the pace of market growth. Rapid market expansion under such a policy brings
about beneficial consequences in two ways. First, more learning take place early on and
the technology cost drops at a faster rate. Second, attracting bigger portions of the market
expedites the spread of information and enlarges prospective demand, which translates into
a larger pool of e cient projects. Both of these e↵ects enable the government to advance
the policy goals in subsequent years at a lower cost. However, a DPI policy requires big
expenditures in the outset to mobilize some less-e cient installations and provides excessive
remuneration to very e cient ones.
On the other hand, under an API framework, the market grows slowly in the early
periods due to conservative tari↵s which appeal only to e cient developers. While slower
market growth moderates technological progress and public consciousness about the tech-
nology, most of the market uptake is pushed toward the end of the horizon when the
learning and di↵usion benefits of early periods have materialized. Postponing bigger ex-
penses to the later periods in the API regime also entails discounting advantages which is
of interest to the legislators. In consideration of tradeo↵s such as these, the direction of
monotonicity under the optimal policy depends on the underlying market characteristics
and may vary for di↵erent jurisdictions (see Section 4.4).
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Before closing this section, we would like to highlight the distinction between the two
sequences of profitability indices and periodic installations. The following proposition states
that there may be situations where a non-monotone structure emerges for annual market
growth. Specifically, it may be optimal to have a period in which the added capacity is
smaller compared to its preceding period.
Proposition 6. For any T • Tmin in Problem (P1), the optimal sequence tmt˚ ut“1,...,T is
increasing if t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is increasing, but can be non-monotone if t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is decreas-
ing. In particular, the same result holds for T “ T ˚ in Problem (P2).
Next, we study the behavior of the optimal policy in general, and see how it is influenced
by model parameters. We address this question with respect to technology and market
characteristics, and derive the corresponding policy implications for both exogenous and
endogenous time windows.
4.4 Impact of Technology and Market Characteristics
In this section, we investigate the impact of learning rate and penetration coe cient. That
is, we show how the optimal strategy structure (DPI versus API) changes with the speed
at which technology maturity and market penetration occur.
We first present a su cient condition which guarantees the optimality of an API policy.
Proposition 7. For any T • Tmin in Problem (P1), the inequality p1 ` nq↵´1 •   is a
su cient condition for having an increasing t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T sequence. In particular, the same
result holds for Problem (P2).
Hence, if ↵ is close enough to 1, n is su ciently small, or   is distant enough from 1,
the optimal policy calls for an API arrangement, i.e., it is optimal to raise the profitability
of capitals invested in the technology across the policy lifetime.
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4.4.1 Learning Parameter ↵
When ↵ varies, contemplating a capacity milestone is no longer equivalent to a cost thresh-
old (see Equation (4.2)). In other words, how far the technology cost declines in response
to attainment of capacity target M˜ is ↵-dependent. As a result, Problems (P1) and (P11)
are not identical anymore, and have to be treated separately.
Theorem 5. Consider Problem (P1) where a capacity target M˜ is set to be accomplished
by the exogenously-imposed deadline T , and assume that T • Tmin so that the target is
feasible. Then, there exist thresholds ↵ˆpM˜, T q and ↵ˇpM˜, T q on the learning parameter ↵
so that the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is
(i) increasing if ↵ P `0, ↵ˆpM˜, T q˘,
(ii) decreasing if ↵ P `↵ˆpM˜, T q, ↵ˇpM˜, T q˘,
(iii) increasing if ↵ P `↵ˇpM˜, T q, 1˘, and
(iv) constant if ↵ “ ↵ˆpM˜, T q or ↵ˇpM˜, T q.
Further, ↵ˆpM˜, T q is decreasing in M˜ and increasing in T , whereas ↵ˇpM˜, T q increases with
M˜ and decreases with T .
Theorem 5 indicates that if learning occurs at a low or high enough rate, that is, if ↵ is
su ciently close to 0 or 1, an API policy is preferred and the profitability index schedule
should increase with time. Moderate values of ↵, on the other hand, requires a DPI policy
in which profit margin is reduced as technology grows. Moreover, the length of the interval
over which such a DPI strategy is optimal shrinks from both sides as the planning horizon
extends or the capacity target subsides.
Recall from Proposition 4 that too high values of T may justify suspending the policy
for the first few periods due to discounting benefits. Such extreme values for T , while may
rarely be encountered in realistic environments, are still captured in Theorem 5. More
precisely, when ⌧˚ • 1, the optimal profitability index sequence is always increasing with
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its first ⌧˚ elements being equal to one. Therefore, ↵ˆpM˜, T q and ↵ˇpM˜, T q become equal in
this case and the second interval in Theorem 5 vanishes.
The intuition behind these findings comes from the tradeo↵s outlined under Theorem
4. When ↵ is small enough, there is not much value in learning to extract. As a result, the
high cost of attracting bigger portions of the distribution in early periods cannot be o↵set
in future periods, because the technology cost remains relatively high. Benefits which can
be exploited from di↵usion e↵ects under rapid market growth is not high enough to justify
its excessive early expenditures. Similarly, su ciently high ↵ empowers the government
to drive down the technology cost even by limiting the policy appeal only to very e cient
investors. Therefore, in both cases, vigorous market expansion in early periods appear
suboptimal, and Theorem 5 recommends an API framework.
For moderate learning, in contrast, it pays o↵ to stretch the investment attractive-
ness to less e cient projects at the outset in anticipation of utilizing the learning and
di↵usion consequences as time progresses. The value gained from these externalities is ad-
equately high to rationalize supporting some less-e cient installations and over-subsidizing
e ciently-operated ones, as happens under a DPI regime.
According to case (iv) in Theorem 5, ↵ˆpM˜, T q and ↵ˇpM˜, T q are the only values of the
learning parameter for which the optimal policy is consistent with the current practice
of uniform profitability across time. Finally, in the last part of the theorem, a longer T
or less ambitious M˜ gives more flexibility in achieving the program’s target. Thus, the
policymaker can a↵ord to ease up on early market growth by implementing an API policy,
as there is more time for its gradual expansion.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates an example of the optimal policy as described by Theorem
5. For small or high values of ↵, as depicted in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(c), the sequence
t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is increasing and an API policy prevails. For moderate values of ↵ where
the learning rate changes between 12% and 19%, the sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T decreases and
gives rise to a DPI arrangement, as illustrated in Figure 4.2(b). Under all these scenarios,
the uniform profitability mechanism is outperformed by the disclosed optimal policies. In
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Figure 4.2: Structure of the Optimal FIT Policy with Capacity Target and Exoge-
nous Horizon
T “ 20, M˜ “ 130, 000, ✓ „ Bp2, 4q,   “ 0.95, n “ 5, c0 “ 100, M0 “ 10.
62
particular, we have observed in our numerical examples that the sub-optimality of the
uniform profitability policy may be as low as 0% (when ↵ is close to ↵ˆ or ↵ˇ), or as high as
80% (when ↵ is away from ↵ˆ and ↵ˇ).
When a cost target is imposed, as in Problem (P11), a new e↵ect is introduced into
the model. In particular, the total capacity required for termination of the program is
no longer fixed, and changes with learning rate. Following Equation (4.2), the market
size needed for the technology cost to fall below c˜ increases as the learning parameter ↵
declines. This creates an additional complication into the analysis as lower values of ↵ ask
for bigger markets to reach cost maturity. As it turns out, this new e↵ect is the dominant
factor in determining the structure of the optimal FIT bill. Still, the following result can
be presented in parallel to Theorem 5:
Theorem 6. Consider Problem (P11) where a cost target c˜ is set to be accomplished by the
exogenously-imposed deadline T . Then, there exist thresholds ↵pc˜, T q and ↵ˇpc˜, T q on the
learning parameter ↵ so that
(i) the target is not feasible if ↵ P `0,↵pc˜, T qs ,
(ii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is decreasing if ↵ P
`
↵pc˜, T q, ↵ˇpc˜, T q˘ ,
(iii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is increasing if ↵ P
`
↵ˇpc˜, T q, 1˘ , and
(iv) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is constant if ↵ “ ↵ˇpc˜, T q.
Furthermore, ↵pc˜, T q and ↵ˇpc˜, T q are both decreasing in c˜ and T .
The proof of the above theorem is quite involved and requires careful handling of first
and second order derivatives and the IGFR assumption on distribution F p.q, as laid out in
the appendix.
The forces driving Theorem 6 are in line with those behind Theorem 5, except that
the required capacity for the policy goal moves with ↵. When ↵ is too small and below
↵pc˜, T q, massive market size is needed to push down the technology cost. Thus, time
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limit T becomes too short for crossing c˜ regardless of the policy expenditure. Once ↵
becomes large enough for the target to be feasible, a two-tier framework emerges. For
higher values of ↵ where a small market size su ces to meet the objective, an API scheme
is the right choice. This is because focusing only on e cient segments of the investor pool
creates enough growth for the policy purpose. However, lower learning rates correspond to
more capacity installments, and require the rapid market expansion that a DPI schedule
cultivates.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the optimal policy with cost target for a numerical example.
For ↵ § 0.11, the target c˜ “ 2 remains infeasible and cannot be reached in T “ 20
periods. As ↵ increases, c˜ translates into a smaller capacity which is feasible to establish.
First, a decreasing t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T sequence appears optimal provided that ↵ § 0.33 (i.e.,
learning rate § 20%). Then, after this threshold is passed, an increasing profitability
index schedule becomes optimal. These two settings are illustrated in Figures 4.3(a) and
4.3(b), respectively. Note that in Figure 4.3(b) and for ↵ “ 0.55, the start of the FIT
program is deferred to period 4 (i.e., ⌧˚ “ 3). When we compare the total cost under the
optimal policy with that of a uniform profitability scheme, the optimality gap of as high
as 90% is observed in our numerical examples. This happens when ↵ is away from ↵ˇ.
Under some mild conditions, similar thresholds exist for Problem (P2) with endoge-
nous T , which determine the desirability and the direction of monotonicity in the optimal
solution. This is formally stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Consider Problem (P2) in which policy horizon is endogenized. There exist
lower bounds ⇧ˆ and ⇢ so that if ⇧ • ⇧ˆ and c0{c˜˚ • ⇢, thresholds ↵pc˜˚q and ↵ˇpc˜˚q can be
derived so that
(i) the technology is not desirable if ↵ P `0,↵pc˜˚qs ,
(ii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is decreasing if ↵ P
`
↵pc˜˚q, ↵ˇpc˜˚q˘ ,
(iii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is increasing if ↵ P
`
↵ˇpc˜˚q, 1˘ , and
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Figure 4.3: Structure of the Optimal FIT Policy with Cost Target and Exogenous
Horizon
T “ 20, c˜ “ 2, ✓ „ Bp2, 4q,   “ 0.95, n “ 5, c0 “ 100, M0 “ 10.
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(iv) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is constant if ↵ “ ↵ˇpc˜˚q.
Furthermore, ↵pc˜˚q and ↵ˇpc˜˚q are both decreasing in c˜˚.
Corollary 2 pertains to Problem (P2) in which FIT program duration is endogenously-
induced as a function of the underlying environment. The corollary states that when the
social value of the renewable energy technology is high enough and the technology is still
in its early stages of development, a DPI or API strategy must be employed depending
on whether learning rate is low or high, respectively. The conditions of the corollary are
needed in the proof to ensure that the structure of the optimal policy does not change
when T ˚ increments upward or downward. If these conditions are violated, the direction
of monotonicity in the optimal policy may alternate multiple times as ↵ varies, and several
segments with API and DPI policies may be observed.
4.4.2 Penetration Coe cient n
When n varies, the speed at which the information about the new technology spreads in
the society changes. The next theorem formalizes the impact of n on the optimal policy.
Theorem 7. Consider Problem (P11) (or, equivalently, Problem (P1)), and assume that
the technology is far enough from maturity, i.e., c0{c˜˚ • ⇢ for some lower bound ⇢. Then,
there exist thresholds npc˜, T q and nˇpc˜, T q on the penetration coe cient n so that
(i) the target is not feasible if n P `0, npc˜, T qs ,
(ii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is decreasing if n P
`
npc˜, T q, nˇpc˜, T q˘ ,
(iii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is increasing if n P
`
nˇpc˜, T q,8˘ , and
(iv) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T is constant if n “ nˇpc˜, T q.
Furthermore, npc˜, T q and nˇpc˜, T q are both decreasing in c˜ and T .
Similarly, under some mild conditions (which hold in many real applications of the FIT
policy), the two-tier structure of Theorem 7 is readily extendible to Problem (P2).
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Corollary 3. Consider Problem (P2) in which policy horizon is endogenized. There exist
lower bounds ⇧ˆ and ⇢ so that if ⇧ • ⇧ˆ and c0{c˜˚ • ⇢, thresholds npc˜˚q and nˇpc˜˚q can be
derived so that
(i) the technology is not desirable if n P `0, npc˜˚qs ,
(ii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is decreasing if n P
`
npc˜˚q, nˇpc˜˚q˘ ,
(iii) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is increasing if n P
`
nˇpc˜˚q,8˘ , and
(iv) the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is constant if n “ nˇpc˜˚q.
Furthermore, npc˜˚q and nˇpc˜˚q are both decreasing in c˜˚.
Therefore, for any fixed policy horizon T and feasible cost target c˜ (or capacity target
M˜), if the technology is su ciently immature, lower values for n imply a DPI policy and
higher values of n entail an API policy. Moreover, these properties hold when the policy
horizon is endogenized if ⇧ is big enough.
The results of Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 propose specific policy guidelines for tari↵-setting
progression over time. Adjustments on the yield on investments in the technology need
to be made by the policymakers over time depending on how weak or strong the learning
and di↵usion e↵ects are. More explicitly, when target is set on cost, and learning and
di↵usion take place at a slow (resp. rapid) rate, it is advisable to let the profitability of
the investments diminish (resp. inflate) with time.
In the hindsight, our framework provides some intuition on the default of Spain’s FIT
program. The country’s Renewable Energy Plan (REP) 2005-2010 had established the
solar PV capacity target of 400 MW to be developed by 2010 (Couture et al. 2010),
and a FIT policy was launched, o↵ering lucrative investment opportunities to achieve this
goal. The objective of these generous tari↵s was to encourage adoption and stimulate
competition and learning at large scale. In response to this incentive and due to rush
of investments, the capacity milestone was transcended in fall 2007,8 much earlier than
8 In Spain, more than 2.5 GW solar capacity was installed in 2007, half of worldwide (EPIA 2009).
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expected. However, the lawmakers found themselves overwhelmed with huge commitments
while the technology cost had not dropped as envisioned (Deutsche Bank 2009). In the
context of our model, Spain’s unsuccessful experience is attributable to underestimating
the parameter n. In particular, even though the vigorous penetration in Spain’s solar
market had to be addressed using an API regime, the government’s aggressive tari↵s in
early periods turned out to be ine↵ective and could not produce the desired outcome.
4.5 Extensions
This chapter deals with some of the possible extensions of our model, either in terms of
relaxing an assumption or taking a di↵erent perspective on the problem, and their implica-
tions on the structure of the optimal policy. We first consider the case of strategic investors
(Section 4.5.1) which imposes an additional constraint on the optimization problem. We
then generalize our objective function to include all possible costs/benefits from a social
welfare standpoint (Section 4.5.2). Finally, we allow for saturation of the market in our
model and investigate its impact on the optimal FIT schedule (Section 4.5.3).
4.5.1 Strategic Investors
In Sections 4.2-4.4, the assumption has been that investors are not strategic in the sense
that they do not wait for a higher profitability if they find the current period’s investment
profitable. This is particularly important when the optimal FIT policy is API, because
later investment may deliver a higher return. If we assume that investors are not myopic
and strategically wait for a higher return on their investment, then an API policy cannot
be implemented. To tackle this issue, we add a new constraint to the optimization prob-
lem by enforcing the profitability index schedule to be non-increasing. This is merely to
prevent any strategic behavior from the investors side, so that each potential investor is
only concerned with the current period’s remunerations. This leads to the following result:
Proposition 8. In both Problems (P1) and (P2), adding the constraint ⇡t • ⇡t`1 for all
periods 1 § t § T ˚:
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• does not impact a DPI policy, but
• turns an API policy into a constant profitability one.
While the result of Proposition 8 seems intuitive, its proof is not trivial at all. Note
that adding the constraint to an otherwise API policy could potentially lead to di↵erent
intervals of constant and DPI schedules. However, this proposition indicates that the
optimal policy in this case is always constant profitability over the entire policy horizon.
4.5.2 Social Welfare Objective
When designing the FIT instruments, the policymakers may have di↵erent objectives in
mind, ranging from minimizing the policy expenditure to maximizing the positive external-
ities of renewable energies. Our focus so far has been on minimizing the policy cost either
with ensuring the accomplishment of a specific target (Problem (P1)), or by incorporating
the social utility of reaching grid parity (Problem (P2)).
In this section, we intend to take a social welfare point of view, and construct a new
objective function that includes all costs/benefits to the society, before and after the grid
parity goal. In the new framework, FIT payments can be left out from the objective
function because, in essence, they are just monetary transfers from government to the
people. To be even more comprehensive, we assume that there is a economic distortion or
administrative burden to the society associated with each unit of FIT payment, which we
denote by  . Hence, all policy expenditures are still present in the new objective function
with this coe cient. Further, we account for the total investment cost in each period as
this is incurred by the society to deploy the new installations. We normalize the coe cient
for this term to equal one.
On the positive side, there is a benefit to the society in each period for every existing
unit of technology. This, for example, includes the growth in the corresponding industry
and the job creation values. We let   to represent all such societal gains per unit of
technology. Moreover, the avoided negative environmental and social externalities for each
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unit of renewably-generated electricity introduces another positive aspect of newly-installed
projects, which is proportional to the actual generated electricity, and is captured with
parameter   per unit of generated electricity.
Putting all together, we can cast the central planner’s optimization problem as:
Zpc˜˚q “ min
pt
#
Tÿ
t“1
 t
´`
 pt ´  ˘mtE “✓ˇˇ✓ •  t‰` ctmt ´  Mt´1¯´ ÿ
t:ct§c˜˚
 t⇧
+
. (P3)
We use the same approach as in Section 4.3 to analyze Problem (P3), even though the
analysis is more involved and the details are omitted here. To proceed, we need to first
introduce the following two functions, which are derived in parallel to functions gp.q and
hp.q in Section 4.3:
gwpx, yq “  `1` nF¯ pxq˘↵´1` 1
 
`
≥1
x ✓fp✓qd✓
x2fpxq
¯
´  x
y
,
hwpx, yq “  
#
np↵´ 1q ≥1x ✓fp✓qd✓
x
` 1´ ↵
 
` `1` nF¯ pxq˘´1` ↵
 
´  x
 y
`
≥1
x ✓fp✓qd✓
x2fpxq
¯+
`   n
≥1
x ✓fp✓qd✓
y
`   
y
.
This allows us to present the main theoretical result of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Consider the social planner’s optimization problem, i.e., Problem (P3).
Then, the optimal profitability indices, t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚, and the optimal cost schedule, tct˚ ut“1,...,T˚,
satisfy the recursive equation gwp1{⇡t´1, ctq “ hwp1{⇡t, ctq. Furthermore, there exists a time
period ⌧˚ P t1, . . . , T ˚u so that,
• the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is increasing for t § ⌧˚, and
• the optimal sequence t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚ is decreasing for t • ⌧˚.
Finally, the result extends to time-dependent   and   as long as  t{ct and  t{ct remains
increasing.
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4.5.3 Saturating Market
In this section, we investigate how the structure of the optimal policy is influenced by mar-
ket saturation. When the potential size of the market (e.g., the total number of investors in
the jurisdiction) is very large compared to the adoption level required to reach grid parity,
saturation is not a crucial factor and can be disregarded as far as our model is concerned.
On the other hand, our results may not carry over if this requirement is not satisfied. To
frame the saturation phenomenon mathematically, we adopt the well-known Bass Model,
and let N represent the overall size of the market. Then, it is easy to show that Equation
(4.3) must be adjusted to account for saturation as,
mt “ nMt´1
´
1´ Mt´1
N
¯
F¯
`
 t
˘
. (4.5)
With this, we can follow the same steps as in Section 4.3, and derive the following two
functions in parallel to functions gp.q and hp.q:
gspx, yq “
´
1` n
´
1´ y
N
¯
F¯ pxq
¯↵´
1`
≥1
x ✓fp✓qd✓
x2fpxq
¯
,
hspx, yq “  
#
n
´
↵´ 1` p2´ ↵q y
N
¯≥1
x ✓fp✓qd✓
x
`
´
1` n
´
1´ 2y
N
¯
F¯ pxq
¯´
1`
≥1
x ✓fp✓qd✓
x2fpxq
¯+
.
Lemma 3. For both Problems (P1) and (P2) with saturation e↵ect, the optimal profitabil-
ity indices, t⇡t˚ ut“1,...,T˚, and the optimal cumulative installation sequence, tMt˚ ut“1,...,T˚,
satisfy the recursive equation gsp1{⇡t´1,Mt´1q “ hsp1{⇡t,Mtq.
Furthermore, there exists a fixed threshold ⇢, so that all the results in Section 4.3 are
extendable to this case if the ratio M˜˚{N is smaller than ⇢, where M˜˚ is the cumulative
installation required to reach grid parity.
If the ratio M˜˚{N is not su ciently small, the problem becomes very complex and is
not analytically tractable. In this case, we have performed an extensive numerical study
to investigate the impact of saturation e↵ect on the optimal FIT policy. For our numerical
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Table 4.1: Model Parameters for the Numerical Study
Parameters Uniform Distribution
↵ r0.15, 0.5s
n r0.5, 5s
  r0.75, 0.95s
T r15, 40s
M˜˚ r104, 106s
N r2M˜˚, 2p106qs
analysis, we have generated 104 instances where the model parameters are drawn randomly
from uniform distributions according to Table 4.1. The result of our numerical analysis
indicates that all findings from Section 4.3 carry over to the case with saturation if M˜˚{N
is smaller than 10%.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the dynamic control of remuneration rates (prices) under feed-in tari↵
policy, the most widely implemented policy instrument for promoting renewable energy
technologies. Under such a mechanism, the government attracts investments and stimu-
lates demand for the technology by sponsoring a certain compensation level or tari↵ for
purchasing electricity from those who have adopted the technology. These tari↵s, which
change over time in response to evolving market realities, are intended to cover the non-
competitively high generation costs and deliver a reasonable profit margin.
We provide a modeling framework which captures, at a macro level, the two principal
dynamics governing the technology dispersion in the market. First, the widespread of
the technology drives down its cost as it creates competition and leads to innovation,
technological improvements, and learning. Second, the more the technology grows, the
more people become aware of it, which stimulates additional demand for the future. These
two network e↵ects are represented by a learning curve and a di↵usion process in our model,
respectively.
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We show that the surplus o↵ered to the investors under the optimal FIT schedule
is always monotone. This goes against the current practice of many FIT-implementing
entities which try to maintain the same level of profitability across di↵erent time periods.
The direction of monotonicity in the optimal FIT regime depends on market and technology
characteristics and the way policy targets are envisaged. In particular, when the policy
horizon is endogenous, the schedule of profitability indices should decrease (resp. increase)
over time for low (reps. high) values of learning rates or penetration speeds. We also
demonstrate that the annual capacity installation should not always increase over time as
existing FIT policies sometime suggest.
Our set-up abstracts away from short term random shocks that the market demand
and the technology cost might experience, and focuses on long term trends. Current
practice accounts for these unexpected changes by adjusting tari↵s so as to keep profitability
of new investments constant. Similar adjustments to our API and DPI policies might
be required. Our results nonetheless suggest that policymakers should overall seek to
consistently increase or decrease profitability, rather than trying to maintain a steady
return.
From a technical standpoint, while we have assumed a fixed cost threshold for achieving
grid parity, our model allows this threshold to be time-dependent. This speaks to the
growing nature of oil and gas prices which may change the cost parity goal over time.
Moreover, even though this chapter is centered around renewable energy technologies, it
can also be applied to a wider spectrum of investment and technology patterns, which fall
under the umbrella of green technologies.
There are several grounds over which this work can be extended. First, data from
existing markets can be used along with empirical methods to estimate model parameters
and calibrate the accuracy of the model and its assumptions. Despite the vast adoption of
FIT policies in di↵erent countries worldwide, this policy measure is still very recent and
hence, there is not enough data available for a comprehensive analysis. (To the best of our
knowledge, Lobel and Perakis (2011) is the only relevant paper here, with 17 data points
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available from the German solar industry.)
Studying the FIT policy design problem with imperfect knowledge about the underlying
market provides another promising research direction. More specifically, this pertains to
a situation where the policymaker’s prior knowledge about the magnitude of the network
externalities is limited or inaccurate. Then, Bayesian updating can take place in each period
so that her assessment of the learning and di↵usion trends is updated after observing the
market’s response to the policy.
Finally, in green technology markets where industry players are big and influential (e.g.,
electric vehicles), accounting for their behavior and its interplay with other elements in the
model could influence the dynamics of the market. These players are strategic and long-
sighted, and may adjust their R&D investment decisions based on their prediction of the
policy outlook in the future. The modified model in this case corresponds to a dynamic
game where the government and industry players form rational expectations about other
players’ strategies.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Results
Appendices A.1 and A.2 contain the proofs to our theoretical results. We first focus on
the corresponding infinite horizon total discounted profit model in Appendix A.1 and show
various properties of the value function which are required for the structural results. Then,
in Appendix A.2, we extend the results to the long-run average case, which completes the
proofs.
A.1 Analysis of the Total Discounted Profit Model
In this appendix, we consider a di↵erent version of the model in Section 2.3 in which the
objective is to maximize the expected total discounted profit of the infinite horizon MDP.
The proofs focus on establishing value function properties that enable the structures of the
optimal policy. We let   represent the discount rate and assume, without loss of generality,
that  ` µ`   “ 1. Note that all results derived in this appendix are independent of this
simplification and hold in general. Later, in Appendix A.2, we show that results from this
section can be extended to the corresponding long-run average profit model by letting  
go to zero.
First, we can derive the optimality equation for the discounted case as J “  J , in
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which operator   is defined as
p Jqpx, k, pq “ max
!
´ cwpxq `  Jpx` 1, k, pq ` µ`↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡`k ppq˘`
µ
`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡´k ppq˘,
r¯ppq ` Jpx´ 1, 0, p0q,
rppq ` Jpx´ 1, 0, p0q
)
, for x • 1 and k • 0 and 0 § p § 1, (A.1)
p Jqp0, 0, p0q “  Jp1, 0, p0q ` µJp0, 0, p0q.
The two linear functions r¯ppq and rppq represent the expected profit of announcing the customer
as type ⌧¯ and ⌧ , respectively, when the subjective probability is p. r¯ppq is increasing in p, while
rppq decreases with p.
Before deriving the properties of the optimal value function, we need to impose the following
assumption which is without loss of generality:
Assumption 1. Parameters v¯, v, c¯ and c are such that, r0 :“ max tr¯pp0q, rpp0qu “ 0.
Recall from Equation (2.4) that changing parameters v¯, v, c¯ and c does not a↵ect the optimal
policy as long as the total rewards v¯` c¯ and v` c remain unchanged. Assumption 1 is without loss
of generality because, for any given v¯, v, c¯ and c, we can redistribute v¯ ` c¯ between v¯ and c¯, and
v ` c between v and c, so that the assumption is satisfied.
Let J ˚ denote the solution to the Bellman’s Equation (A.1). That is, J ˚ represents the optimal
value function for the discounted model when the discount rate is  . Then, J ˚ px, 0, p0q • J ˚ px ´
1, 0, p0q ` r0 from the optimality equation, which reduces to J ˚ px, 0, p0q • J ˚ px ´ 1, 0, p0q using
Assumption 1. From this, we deduce that J ˚ px, 0, p0q • 0 and J ˚ px, 0, p0q Õ x, which will be
repeatedly used later in the proofs.
Next, we prove the following properties of the optimal value function J ˚ :
C1 For any fixed x and k, J ˚ px, k, pq is convex in p for 0 § p § 1.
C2 For any fixed k and p, J ˚ px, k, pq ´ J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q Œ x.
C3 If the sequence of tests is well-ordered, for any fixed x and p, J ˚ px, k, pq Œ k.
In order to prove the above properties, we first prove the convergence of the value iteration
algorithm and existence of the optimal value function.
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Lemma 4. The optimal value function, J ˚ , satisfies the Bellman’s Equation (A.1) such that  J ˚ “
J ˚ , and can be obtained by the value iteration algorithm starting from any arbitrary function J0,
i.e.:
lim
nÑ8 
pnqJ0 “ J ˚ .
Proof: Since we have a maximization problem and the instantaneous costs ´cwpxq, rppq and
r¯ppq are bounded from above, the Negativity Assumption holds and the result follows. (Bertsekas
2007b, Volume II, Proposition 3.1.6)
Having the existence of the optimal value function established, we next show its convexity in
parameter p.
Lemma 5. Operator   propagates Property C1. Hence, the optimal value function, J ˚ px, k, pq, is
convex in p for 0 § p § 1.
Proof:Consider the Bellman’s Equation (A.1). First note that the maximum of a finite collec-
tion of convex functions is still convex. Moreover, the second and the third term in the maximization
are linear and therefore convex in p. It remains to show the convexity of the first term in p. For
this, we prove that
`
↵kp`p1´ kqp1´ pq˘Jpx, k` 1,⇡`k ppqq is convex in p. The proof for convexity
of
`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘Jpx, k ` 1,⇡´k ppqq is exactly similar.
For notational simplicity, we use Jppq, ↵,   and ⇡ppq to represent Jpx, k ` 1, pq, ↵k,  k and
⇡`k ppq, respectively. Assume Jppq is convex in p, with a sub-gradient J ppq P BJppq. That is:
Jpp` ✏q • Jppq ` J ppq✏
Let:
hppq “ p↵p` p1´  qp1´ pqqJp⇡ppqq
in which:
⇡ppq “ ↵p
↵p` p1´  qp1´ pq
Define:
p✏ “ ↵pp` ✏q
↵pp` ✏q ` p1´  qp1´ p´ ✏q
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Note that for ✏ su ciently small (i.e., ✏ † 1´ p), we have 0 † p✏ † 1. Next,
hpp` ✏q ´ hppq
“ p↵pp` ✏q ` p1´  qp1´ p´ ✏qqJpp✏q ´ p↵p` p1´  qp1´ pqqJp⇡ppqq
• p↵pp` ✏q ` p1´  qp1´ p´ ✏qq pJp⇡ppqq ` J p⇡ppqqpp✏ ´ ⇡ppqqq ´ p↵p` p1´  qp1´ pqqJp⇡ppqq
“ ✏
ˆ
p↵`   ´ 1qJp⇡ppqq ` ↵p1´  q
↵p` p1´  qp1´ pqJ p⇡ppqq
˙
In the first inequality, we have used both the convexity of J at ⇡ppq and the fact that the
denominator for p✏ is positive. Therefore hppq is convex in p with the following quantity
as a sub-gradient:
p↵`   ´ 1qJp⇡ppqq ` ↵p1´  q
↵p` p1´  qp1´ pqJ p⇡ppqq.
Thus, convexity of J in p implies convexity of  J . Then, the convexity of J ˚ in p directly
follows from Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. When p “ 1, announcing ⌧¯ is the optimal decision so that J ˚ px, k, 1q “
v¯ ` J ˚ px ´ 1, 0, p0q. Similarly, when p “ 0, announcing ⌧ is the optimal decision so that
J ˚ px, k, 0q “ v ` J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q.
Proof: Suppose the system is at state px, k, 1q. If the search on the current customer
continues for a (random) period of length T ° 0, the server’s belief about the customer’s
type remains equal to one during T because ⇡`k p1q “ ⇡´k p1q “ 1. After T , the customer
is released and profit e´ T v¯ is obtained. Alternatively, if the server releases the current
customer right away and remains idle during T , the higher profit of v¯ is gained and less
waiting cost is incurred during T . (In both cases, the system transits into state pxT `
x´ 1, 0, p0q after T , where xT is the number of arrivals during T .) Therefore, the optimal
decision at state px, k, 1q is to stop and identify the customer as type ⌧¯ .
The proof for the second part is similar.
Lemmas 5 and 6 will be used in Appendix A.2 to prove Theorem 1. Next, we show
that the optimal value function holds Property C2.
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Lemma 7. The optimal value function, J ˚ , is such that J ˚ px, k, pq´ J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q Œ x.
Proof: Let T be a random variable representing the time needed to go from state
px ` 1, k, pq to state px, 0, p0q, when the system operates under the optimal policy. First,
T † 8 because otherwise, the queue length must be always higher than x, which can not
be true under the optimal policy.
Now suppose the system is at state px, k, pq and consider a policy u which, instead
of following the optimal policy for the current system, follows the optimal policy for an
otherwise identical system with a queue length of x ` 1. This continues until the queue
length drops to x´ 1 for the first time. From that point onwards, policy u coincides with
the optimal policy for the current system. Define cˆ “ minx tcwpx` 1q ´ cwpxqu. It follows
that,
Ju  px, k, pq •
´
J ˚ px`1, k, pq´E
“
e´ T
‰
J ˚ px, 0, p0q
¯
`E “e´ T ‰ J ˚ px´1, 0, p0q`E „ª T
0
cˆe´ tdt
⇢
.
The right hand side of the above inequality is the value function under policy u except that
we have used a lower bound for the waiting cost of the one additional customer during T .
Note that E
”≥T
0 cˆe
´ tdt
ı
• 0, and hence, this term can be dropped from the right hand
side. Next, since Ju  px, k, pq provides a lower bound for J ˚ px, k, pq, we have
J ˚ px, k, pq •
´
J ˚ px` 1, k, pq ´ E
“
e´ T
‰
J ˚ px, 0, p0q
¯
` E “e´ T ‰ J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q
ñ J ˚ px, k, pq ´ E
“
e´ T
‰
J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q • J ˚ px` 1, k, pq ´ E
“
e´ T
‰
J ˚ px, 0, p0q
Furthermore, J ˚ px, 0, p0q Õ x implies that,
´E “1´ e´ T ‰ J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q • ´E “1´ e´ T ‰ J ˚ px, 0, p0q
Adding this inequality to the one obtained above gives us:
J ˚ px, k, pq ´ J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q • J ˚ px` 1, k, pq ´ J ˚ px, 0, p0q .
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According to Lemma 7, the added value of the current task is nonincreasing in the
number of accumulated tasks, when the agent operates based on the optimal policy.
Finally, assume that the sequence of tests is well-ordered. The next lemma describes
the behavior of the optimal value function in k.
Lemma 8. If the sequence of tests is well-ordered, the optimal value function, J ˚ , is such
that J ˚ px, k, pq Œ k.
Proof: Suppose the sequence of tests is well-ordered, and let ⇠1k and ⇠2k be the corre-
sponding coe cients for the ordering of the pk ` 1qst and the pk ` 2qnd tests. Assuming
that the function J holds Property C3, we show that  J preserves this property.
First, after plugging in the formulas for ⇡`k`1p.q and ⇡´k`1p.q and then replacing ↵k`1
and  k`1 by their equivalent values in terms of ↵k and  k, we can use the convexity of J
in p (see Lemma 5 which ensures the convexity of the value function in each step of the
value iteration algorithm) to get the following inequalities:
J
`
x, k ` 2,⇡`k`1ppq
˘ §
⇠1k
`
↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘`
⇠1k↵k ` ⇠2kp1´ ↵kq˘p` `⇠2k k ` ⇠1kp1´  kq˘p1´ pqJ`x, k ` 2,⇡`k ppq˘`
⇠2k
`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘`
⇠1k↵k ` ⇠2kp1´ ↵kq˘p` `⇠2k k ` ⇠1kp1´  kq˘p1´ pqJ`x, k ` 2,⇡´k ppq˘
J
`
x, k ` 2,⇡´k`1ppq
˘ §
p1´ ⇠1kq`↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘`p1´ ⇠1kq↵k ` p1´ ⇠2kqp1´ ↵kq˘p` `p1´ ⇠2kq k ` p1´ ⇠1kqp1´  kq˘p1´ pqJ`x, k ` 2,⇡`k ppq˘`
p1´ ⇠2kq`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘`p1´ ⇠1kq↵k ` p1´ ⇠2kqp1´ ↵kq˘p` `p1´ ⇠2kq k ` p1´ ⇠1kqp1´  kq˘p1´ pqJ`x, k ` 2,⇡´k ppq˘
Multiplying the first inequality by
`
↵k`1p ` p1 ´  k`1qp1 ´ pq˘ and the second inequality by`p1´ ↵k`1qp`  k`1p1´ pq˘ and adding them up leads to (after some algebraic simplifications),
`
↵k`1p`p1´ k`1qp1´pq˘J`x, k`2,⇡`k`1ppq˘` `p1´↵k`1qp` k`1p1´pq˘J`x, k`2,⇡´k`1ppq˘ §
`
↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 2,⇡`k ppq˘` `p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 2,⇡´k ppq˘
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This inequality together with C3 implies that,
`
↵k`1p`p1´ k`1qp1´pq˘J`x, k`2,⇡`k`1ppq˘` `p1´↵k`1qp` k`1p1´pq˘J`x, k`2,⇡´k`1ppq˘ §`
↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡`k ppq˘` `p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡´k ppq˘
Multiplying by µ and another use of C3 results in,
 Jpx` 1, k ` 1, pq ` µ`↵k`1p` p1´  k`1qp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 2,⇡`k`1ppq˘`
µ
`p1´ ↵k`1qp`  k`1p1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 2,⇡´k`1ppq˘ §
 Jpx` 1, k, pq ` µ`↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡`k ppq˘`
µ
`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘J`x, k ` 1,⇡´k ppq˘
ñ  Jpx, k ` 1, pq §  Jpx, k, pq .
Since Operator   propagates Property C3, by Lemma 4, the optimal value function holds this
property as well. This completes the proof.
Therefore, the optimal value function holds Properties C1-C3.
Finally, we present the following lemma which limits the maximum number of customers allowed
in the system for the discounted model.
Lemma 9. For any given k • 0 and 0 § p § 1, there exists a finite value x¯pk, pq so that it is
optimal to stop at state px, k, pq with x • x¯pk, pq. Further, finite x¯ exists so that it is always optimal
to stop at state px, k, pq with x • x¯ for all k and p.
Proof:Define   ˚px, k, pq “ J ˚ px, k, pq ´ J ˚ px ´ 1, 0, p0q and rewrite the Bellman’s Equation
(A.1) for the optimal value function in the following form which is obtained by subtracting J ˚ px´
1, 0, p0q from both sides.
  ˚px, k, pq “ max
!
´ cwpxq `    ˚px` 1, k, pq `    ˚px, 0, p0q `
µ
`
↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘  ˚`x, k ` 1,⇡`k ppq˘`
µ
`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘  ˚`x, k ` 1,⇡´k ppq˘´  J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q,
r¯ppq, rppq
)
.
Note that ´cwpxq is strictly decreasing in x by assumption, all terms involving   ˚ are nonincreasing
in x from Property C2, and ´ J ˚ px ´ 1, 0, p0q is nonincreasing in x since J ˚ px ´ 1, 0, p0q Õ x.
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Thus, the first term in the maximization is strictly decreasing in x while the second term (r¯ppq)
and the third term (rppq) do not change with x. It follows that as x increases, there is a break even
point, denoted by x¯pk, pq, above which max tr¯ppq, rppqu dominates the first term and it is optimal
to stop.
Finally, we introduce x¯ “ maxpk,pq tx¯pk, pqu. Then, it is never optimal to continue testing when
x • x¯, and all states px, k, pq with x • x¯ are transient states.
Note that all properties obtained in this appendix for the optimal value function of the dis-
counted model hold for any value of the discount rate   and regardless of the simplification
 ` µ`   “ 1.
A.2 Extension to the Long-Run Average Profit Model
In this appendix, we show that all the results derived for the total discounted profit model in
Appendix A.1 still hold when we change the objective to maximizing the long-run average profit.
Then, we use this fact to provide the proofs for the main results stated in the chapter. To this end,
we verify SEN conditions (Sennott 1999, Chapter 7) in our setting. If the three SEN conditions
hold, the convergence of the total discounted profit model to the long-run average profit model is
guaranteed, as we let   go to zero. The SEN conditions can be verified as discussed below.
SEN1 Consider state p0, 0, p0q. Suppose ti indicates the arrival time of the ith customer in the
future. If the agent can make the correct diagnosis for all upcoming tasks in zero time, the
total discounted profit obtained is,
E
« 8ÿ
i“1
`
p0v¯ ` p1´ p0qv˘e´ ti  “ `p0v¯ ` p1´ p0qv˘ 8ÿ
i“1
E
“
e´ ti
‰ “
`
p0v¯ ` p1´ p0qv˘ 8ÿ
i“1
´
1`  
 
¯´i “ `p0v¯ ` p1´ p0qv˘ 
 
In the above derivation, we have used the fact that ti has Erlang distribution with parameters
  and i. It follows that,
 J ˚ p0, 0, p0q §  
`
p0v¯ ` p1´ p0qv˘ 
 
“  `p0v¯ ` p1´ p0qv˘ † 8 .
SEN2 Suppose the system is at state px, k, pq. If the agent releases all existing customers without
performing any test to reach state p0, 0, p0q and follows the optimal policy thereafter, the
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value of max tr¯ppq, rppqu ` px´ 1qr0` J ˚ p0, 0, p0q is generated which gives us a lower bound
for J ˚ px, k, pq. Thus, J ˚ px, k, pq ´ J ˚ p0, 0, p0q has max tr¯ppq, rppqu as its lower bound which
is further bounded from below by r¯p✓q.
SEN3 To verify this condition, we need to find a finite constant which uniformly bounds J ˚ px, k, pq´
J ˚ p0, 0, p0q from above, for all px, k, pq and  . Lemma 9 allows us to deduce that J ˚ px, 0, p0q “
J ˚ px¯, 0, p0q for x • x¯. On the other hand, J ˚ px, 0, p0q Õ x implies that J ˚ px, 0, p0q §
J ˚ px¯, 0, p0q for x † x¯. These two together give us
J ˚ px, k, pq ´ J ˚ p0, 0, p0q § max tv¯, vu ` J ˚ px´ 1, 0, p0q ´ J ˚ p0, 0, p0q
§ max tv¯, vu ` J ˚ px¯, 0, p0q ´ J ˚ p0, 0, p0q § px¯` 1qmax tv¯, vu † 8 .
The last inequality is obtained by assuming that when the system is at state px¯, 0, p0q, all
customers are correctly diagnosed without performing any test and the maximum possible
value is collected from each task so that the system transits into state p0, 0, p0q in zero time.
Therefore, the SEN conditions are satisfied and all the results from Appendix A.1 can be
extended to the long-run average profit model of Sections 2.3. In particular, the optimal value
function associated with the model of Section 2.3, which we denote by J˚, holds Properties C1-
C3.
Now, we are in the position to present the proofs for the theoretical results stated in the chapter.
Proof of Theorem 1:
For any fixed x • 1 and k • 0, denote the three terms in Bellman’s Equation (2.5) by
Hppq, R¯ppq and Rppq, respectively. First, an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 5 together
with Property C1 shows that Hppq is convex in p. Moreover, R¯ppq is linearly increasing and Rppq
is linearly decreasing in p, and the two linear functions intersect at p “ ✓.
There are two possible cases to consider:
(i) If max
 
R¯ppq, Rppq( • Hppq for all p P r0, 1s, then continuing search is always dominated by
stopping. In this case, ppx, kq “ p¯px, kq “ ✓.
(ii) Otherwise, we know from Lemma 6 that Rp0q • Hp0q and R¯p1q • Hp1q, and from the
definition of R¯p.q and Rp.q that Rp0q ° R¯p0q and Rp1q † R¯p1q. Then, the inequality
max
 
R¯ppq, Rppq( † Hppq for some p, together with convexity of Hppq in p implies that R¯ppq
83
and Rppq each must intersect with Hppq exactly once in the interval r0, 1s. The intersection
points are p¯px, kq and ppx, kq, respectively. In this case, ppx, kq † ✓ † p¯px, kq.
To show the monotonicity of thresholds, suppose it is optimal to stop testing and identify the
customer as type ⌧¯ at state px, k, pq, i.e., J˚px, k, pq “ J˚px ´ 1, 0, p0q ` r¯ppq. From Property
C2 and since J˚px ` 1, k, pq • J˚px, 0, p0q ` r¯ppq (Bellman’s Equation (2.5)), we should have
J˚px ` 1, k, pq “ J˚px, 0, p0q ` r¯ppq. This, in turn, implies that it is optimal to stop the search at
state px ` 1, k, pq and announce ⌧¯ . In other words, p • p¯px, kq implies p • p¯px ` 1, kq and hence,
p¯px, kq Œ x.
Following the same logic, one can show that if it is optimal to stop testing and identify the
customer as type ⌧ at state px, k, pq, it is optimal to do so as well at state px` 1, k, pq, and hence,
ppx, kq Õ x.
Finally, the existence of x¯ follows directly from Lemma 9.
Proof of Proposition 1:
From Property C3, J˚px, k, pq Œ k. Suppose it is optimal to announce ⌧¯ at state px, k, pq,
i.e., J˚px, k, pq “ J˚px ´ 1, 0, p0q ` r¯ppq. From the monotonicity of J˚px, k, pq in k and since
J˚px, k`1, pq • J˚px´1, 0, p0q` r¯ppq (Bellman’s Equation (2.5)), we should have J˚px, k`1, pq “
J˚px´1, 0, p0q` r¯ppq. This in turn, implies that it is optimal to stop the search at state px, k`1, pq
and announce ⌧¯ . In other words, p • p¯px, kq implies p • p¯px, k ` 1q and hence, p¯px, kq Œ k.
A similar argument shows that p § ppx, kq implies p § ppx, k ` 1q and hence, ppx, kq Õ k.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is complete if we can show the following three results for the one sided model:
(i) If it is optimal to stop and announce type ⌧¯ at state px, kq, it is also optimal to stop and
announce type ⌧¯ at state px, k ` 1q.
(ii) If it is optimal to stop and announce type ⌧ at state px, kq, it is also optimal to stop and
announce type ⌧ at state px, k ´ 1q.
(iii) If it is optimal to stop and announce type ⌧¯ (resp. ⌧) at state px, kq, it is also optimal to
stop and announce type ⌧¯ (resp. ⌧) at state px` 1, kq.
Statements (i) and (ii) correspond to the existence of two thresholds for each value of x, and
statement (iii) implies the monotonicity of these thresholds in x. To proceed, we use the results for
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the general two sided model and note that state px, kq in the one sided model is equivalent to state
px, k, pkq in the general case.
(i) Suppose it is optimal to stop and announce type ⌧¯ at state px, kq (i.e., px, k, pkq). By Theorem
1, the same decision is optimal at state px, k, pk`1q since pk`1 ° pk. Then, Proposition 1
implies that announcing ⌧¯ is also optimal at state px, k ` 1, pk`1q, which is equivalent to
state px, k ` 1q in the one sided case.
(ii) Next, suppose it is optimal to stop and announce type ⌧ at state px, kq (i.e., px, k, pkq). Since
⇡`k´1ppk´1q “ pk, this translates into announcing ⌧ being optimal at state
`
x, k,⇡`k´1ppk´1q
˘
.
Then, from Theorem 1, the same decision is also optimal at state
`
x, k,⇡´k´1ppk´1q
˘
because
⇡´k´1ppk´1q “ 0 † ⇡`k´1ppk´1q. Further, again by monotonicity of thresholds in x as stated
in Theorem 1, announcing ⌧ is optimal at states
`
x1, k,⇡`k´1ppk´1q
˘
and
`
x1, k,⇡´k´1ppk´1q
˘
for all x1 ° x. In particular, consider x1 “ x¯ ´ 1. From Lemma 9, stop decision is optimal
at state px¯, k´ 1, pk´1q. Moreover, announcing ⌧ dominates announcing ⌧¯ at this state since
pk´1 † ✓ (this is implied by pk “ ⇡`k´1ppk´1q † ✓). Hence, announcing ⌧ is the optimal
decision at all three possible states that can be reached from state px¯ ´ 1, k ´ 1, pk´1q. It
follows that the same decision should be optimal at state px¯´1, k´1, pk´1q as well. Iterative
use of this argument implies that announcing ⌧ is optimal at all states px1, k´ 1, pk´1q with
x1 • x, which are equivalent to states px1, k ´ 1q in the one sided case.
(iii) The proof for this result is exactly the same as the proof for the monotonicity of thresholds
in x as stated in Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The condition p0 • ✓ is equivalent to k✓ “ 0. The necessity directly follows from the structure
of the optimal policy described in Proposition 2. To prove the su ciency, consider state px¯, 0q.
According to Lemma 9, the optimal policy should release the customer at this state without per-
forming any test. Since the optimal policy is fully characterized by thresholds k¯pxq, we should
have k¯px¯q “ 0. That is, the optimal decision at this state is to announce the customer as type ⌧¯ .
This implies that announcing ⌧¯ dominates announcing ⌧ at this state which further implies that
r¯pp0q • rpp0q, and this is equivalent to p0 • ✓.
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A.3 No Congestion Case
This appendix formalizes the model and analysis of the diagnostic system without congestion.
Various propositions presented in this appendix are referred to in the main text as a comparison
to the system with congestion studied in the chapter. The no congestion case in our context
corresponds to systems with ample service capacity, i.e., with an infinite number of agents.
Diagnostic problems without congestion e↵ects are traditionally modeled as sequential hypothe-
sis testing problems (see, for instance, Wald 1947 and DeGroot 1970) or search problems (Bertsekas
2007a), where each additional test incurs an exogenous cost. In our context, it can be considered
as a system with infinite number of servers, such that arriving customers always find an avail-
able server. The problem consists in balancing the diagnosis accuracy against the search cost,
cs, which corresponds to the expected cost of holding one customer during the elicitation time, i.e.
cs “ cwp1q{µ. The objective is to maximize the expected total profit. The corresponding optimality
equation is
Jspk, pq “ p Jsqpk, pq “ max
!
´ cs ` `↵kp` p1´  kqp1´ pq˘Js`k ` 1,⇡`k ppq˘`
`p1´ ↵kqp`  kp1´ pq˘Js`k ` 1,⇡´k ppq˘, r¯ppq, rppq). (A.2)
Note that when the number of servers is infinite, the optimal value of objective function gu
(Equation (2.3)) is equal to  Jsp0, p0q. In other words, with ample capacity, diagnostic tasks do not
accumulate in the sense that the time spent diagnosing one customer does not have any influence
on the waiting time of the other customers. The problem becomes then separable.
The following characterization of the optimal policy for the diagnostic system without conges-
tion can be directly implied from Theorem 1 and Proposition 1.
Corollary 4. The optimal policy for the diagnostic system without congestion may be characterized
by two thresholds ppkq and p¯pkq such that if state pp, kq satisfies ppkq † p † p¯pkq, it is optimal to
continue testing. Otherwise, it is optimal to stop and identify the customer as type ⌧ when p § ppkq,
or as type ⌧¯ when p • p¯pkq. Moreover, if the sequence of tests is well-ordered, ppkq is nondecreasing
and p¯pkq is nonincreasing in k.
In the single diagnostic task case, the expected profit of identifying a customer as type ⌧ (resp.
⌧¯) decreases after observing a positive (resp. negative) test result. Therefore, the profit would have
been higher had the service provider identified the customer as type ⌧ (resp. ⌧¯) before performing
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the test, rather than after receiving an opposite signal. The next proposition formally states this
intuition.
Proposition 9. In the search problem without congestion, it is never optimal to stop the search
process and diagnose the customer as type ⌧ after a positive signal, or as type ⌧¯ after a negative
signal.
Proof:On the contrary to the statement, suppose it is optimal to continue at state pk, pq, but
optimal to stop and announce ⌧¯ after a negative signal, i.e., at state pk ` 1,⇡´k ppqq. It follows
that Js˚ pk ` 1,⇡´k ppqq “ r¯p⇡´k ppqq. Further, by Corollary 4, announcing ⌧¯ is also optimal at state
pk ` 1,⇡`k ppqq since ⇡`k ppq ° ⇡´k ppq, and hence, Js˚ pk ` 1,⇡`k ppqq “ r¯p⇡`k ppqq. Plugging in these
values in Equation (A.2) and some algebraic simplifications give us,
Js˚ pk, pq “ max
!
´ cs ` r¯ppq, r¯ppq, rppq
)
,
which contradicts the assumption of continuing the search being optimal at state pk, pq. Thus,
announcing ⌧¯ after a negative signal can not be optimal. The proof for the other case (announcing
⌧ after a positive signal) is similar.
In the system without congestion, the current subjective probability p is already a su cient
statistic, regardless of where it is from, in particular, p0.
Proposition 10. The specifications of the optimal policy, ppkq and p¯pkq, in the diagnostic system
without congestion do not change with the base rate p0.
Proof:The proof directly follows from Equation (A.2) since the parameter p0 is not present
in the equation. Therefore, two di↵erent systems with di↵erent base rates share the same optimal
policy as long as all other parameters are the same for the two systems.
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Results
We start our analysis by first considering the corresponding model with total discounted value
objective. After establishing the structural properties of the optimal value function and proving
our results in this setting, we show that they can be extended to the model with long-run average
value objective by letting the discount rate go to zero.
When the objective is to maximize the total discounted value, and assuming the discount rate
to be  , the optimal value function satisfies  J˚p., .q “ J˚p., .q, where the operator   is defined in
parallel to Bellman’s Equation (3.1) as,
 Jpn, dq “ max
!
´ wpnq `  Jpn` 1, dq ` µ` pd ` p1´  qp1´ pdq˘J`n, d` 1˘
`µ`p1´  qpd `  p1´ pdq˘J`n, d´ 1˘,
rppdq ` Jpn´ 1, 0q,
r¯ppdq ` Jpn´ 1, 0q,
Jpn´ 1, dq
)
, for n • 1 and any d, (B.1)
 Jp0, 0q “  Jp1, 0q ` µJp0, 0q.
In the above optimality equation, we have assumed, without loss of generality, that  ` µ`   “ 1.
Lemma 10. The optimal value function, J˚p., .q, satisfying Bellman’s Equation (B.1) such that
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 J˚p., .q “ J˚p., .q uniquely exists, and can be obtained by the value iteration algorithm starting
from any arbitrary function J0p., .q, i.e.,
lim
kÑ8 
pkqJ0p., .q “ J˚p., .q .
Proof: Since we have a maximization problem and the instantaneous costs ´wpnq, rppdq and
r¯ppdq are bounded from above, the Negativity Assumption holds and the result follows (Bertsekas
2007b, Proposition 3.1.6).
Lemma 11. For the optimal value function, J˚p., .q, and any fixed d we have
J˚pn, dq ´ J˚pn´ 1, 0q Œ n .
Proof: Suppose the system is at state pn ` 1, dq and operates under the optimal policy. Let
T be a random variable representing the time needed to either reach state pn, 0q or dismiss an
unprocessed task for the first time. First, T † 8 because otherwise, the queue length must always
remain higher than n, which cannot be true under the optimal policy.
Next consider a policy u which is di↵erent than the optimal policy in the following manner.
Instead of following the optimal policy for the current system, policy u follows the optimal policy
for an otherwise identical system with one extra task in the queue. More precisely, when the system
is at state pn1, d1q, policy u chooses the optimal action corresponding to state pn1 ` 1, d1q. Define
wˆ “ minn twpn` 1q ´ wpnqu. Now assume that the system is at state pn, dq and operates under
policy u over a period of length T . After time T is elapsed, one of the following two scenarios has
happened:
(i) The system is at some state pn1, d1q, and the optimal policy at state pn1 ` 1, d1q prescribes
dismissing an unprocessed task from the queue. In this case, policy u does not dismiss any
task from the queue and coincides with the optimal policy afterwards. It follows that,
Jupn, dq •
´
J˚pn` 1, dq ´ E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn1 ` 1, d1q¯` E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn1, d1q ` E«ª T
0
wˆe´ tdt
 
ñ Jupn, dq •
´
J˚pn` 1, dq ´ E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn1, d1q¯` E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn1, d1q ` E«ª T
0
wˆe´ tdt
 
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ñ Jupn, dq • J˚pn` 1, dq ` E
«ª T
0
wˆe´ tdt
 
.
(ii) The system is at some state pn, d1q and the optimal policy at state pn ` 1, d1q prescribes
releasing the task in service. In this case, policy u also releases the task in service and
continues following the optimal policy afterwards. It follows that,
Jupn, dq •
´
J˚pn` 1, dq ´ E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn, 0q¯` E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn´ 1, 0q ` E«ª T
0
wˆe´ tdt
 
.
Noting that J˚pn, dq • J˚pn´ 1, dq, we can deduce in both cases that
J˚pn, dq • Jupn, dq •
´
J˚pn` 1, dq ´ E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn, 0q¯` E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn´ 1, 0q
ñ J˚pn, dq ´ E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn´ 1, 0q • J˚pn` 1, dq ´ E “e´ T ‰ J˚pn, 0q.
Furthermore, J˚pn, dq Õ n implies, for any finite T , that
´E “1´ e´ T ‰ J˚pn´ 1, 0q • ´E “1´ e´ T ‰ J˚pn, 0q.
Adding the above two inequalities gives us
J˚pn, dq ´ J˚pn´ 1, 0q • J˚pn` 1, dq ´ J˚pn, 0q.
Lemma 12. For the optimal value function, J˚p., .q, and any fixed n we have
J˚pn, dq ´ r¯ppdq Õ d .
Proof:We prove that operator   propagates the property Jpn, dq ´ r¯ppdq Õ d. This, together
with Lemma 10 completes the proof.
For any 0 § p § 1, let p` “  p` p1´  qp1´ pq and p´ “ p1´  qp`  p1´ pq. We start from
the following equality (simple algebra shows that this equality holds):
r¯ppdq ´ p`d r¯ppd`1q ´ p´d r¯ppd´1q “ r¯ppd´1q ´ p`d´1r¯ppdq ´ p´d´1r¯ppd´2q
Replacing p´ with 1´ p` and some straightforward algebra:
`
p`d ´p`d´1
˘`
r¯ppd´1q´ r¯ppdq˘ “ p`d `r¯ppd`1q´ r¯ppdq˘´ r¯ppdq` r¯ppd´1q`p1´p`d´1q`r¯ppd´1q´ r¯ppd´2q˘
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With the assumption that Jp., .q holds the property:
`
p`d ´p`d´1
˘`
Jpn, d´1q´Jpn, dq˘ § p`d `r¯ppd`1q´r¯ppdq˘´r¯ppdq`r¯ppd´1q`p1´p`d´1q`r¯ppd´1q´r¯ppd´2q˘
Adding Jpn, d´ 1q to both sides:
p`d´1Jpn, dq ` p1´ p`d´1q
`
Jpn, d´ 1q ´ r¯ppd´1q ` r¯ppd´2q˘´ r¯ppd´1q §
p`d
`
Jpn, dq ` r¯ppd`1q ´ r¯ppdq˘` p1´ p`d qJpn, d´ 1q ´ r¯ppdq
With the assumption that Jp., .q holds the property:
p`d´1Jpn, dq ` p1´ p`d´1qJpn, d´ 2q ´ r¯ppd´1q § p`d Jpn, d` 1q ` p1´ p`d qJpn, d´ 1q ´ r¯ppdq
Multiplying both sides by µ and another use of the assumption:
 Jpn` 1, d´ 1q ` µp`d´1Jpn, dq ` µp´d´1Jpn, d´ 2q ´ p ` µqr¯ppd´1q §
 Jpn` 1, dq ` µp`d Jpn, d` 1q ` µp´d Jpn, d´ 1q ´ p ` µqr¯ppdq
Adding the inequality ´ r¯ppd´1q § ´ r¯ppdq to the above inequality:
 Jpn` 1, d´ 1q ` µp`d´1Jpn, dq ` µp´d´1Jpn, d´ 2q ´ r¯ppd´1q §
 Jpn` 1, dq ` µp`d Jpn, d` 1q ` µp´d Jpn, d´ 1q ´ r¯ppdq.
Another use of the assumption and noting that the maximum of a set of increasing functions is still
increasing implies that,
 Jpn, d´ 1q ´ r¯ppd´1q §  Jpn, dq ´ r¯ppdq
ñ  Jpn, dq ´ r¯ppdq Õ d .
Lemma 13. For the optimal value function, J˚p., .q, and any fixed n we have
J˚pn, dq ´ rppdq Œ d .
Proof:We prove that operator   propagates the property Jpn, dq ´ rppdq Œ d. This, together
with Lemma 10 completes the proof.
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We start from the following equality:
rppdq ´ p`d rppd`1q ´ p´d rppd´1q “ rppd´1q ´ p`d´1rppdq ´ p´d´1rppd´2q.
Following steps very similar to those in the proof of Lemma 12, we deduce that,
 Jpn, d´ 1q ´ rppd´1q •  Jpn, dq ´ rppdq
ñ  Jpn, dq ´ rppdq Œ d .
Lemma 14. For the optimal value function, J˚p., .q, and any fixed n and d, if J˚pn ` 1, dq °
J˚pn, dq then J˚pn, dq ° J˚pn´ 1, dq.
Proof:The proof proceeds using a sample path argument. Consider two systems, A and B,
which are at states pn`1, dq and pn, dq, respectively, and let T be a random variable representing the
time until the first task is released from system A. Also let NT denote the number of new arrivals
over T . Assume J˚pn` 1, dq ° J˚pn, dq holds. This inequality implies that J˚pn` 1, dq ° Jupn, dq
where policy u in system B works as follows: at each state, policy u adds an auxiliary task to the
end of the queue and then follows the optimal policy until time T is elapsed. Thus, over time T ,
system B is able to collect all the rewards that is collected under the optimal policy in system A,
while incurs a lower holding cost (because of holding one fewer task).
After time T , if the task which is released from system A is an unprocessed task, system B
does not release a task and both systems transit into state pn`NT , d1q, where d1 is the intensity of
preference at time T . Along these sample paths, system B under policy u outperforms system A
under the optimal policy because of incurring a lower holding cost. On the other hand, if system A
releases the current task at time T , it collects max trpd1q, r¯pd1qu and transits into state pn`NT , 0q.
In this case, system B under policy u does not release a task and hence, remains at state pn`NT , d1q.
Next, let T 1 be a random variable representing the time at which system A releases the task in
process and NT 1 the number of new arrivals during this period. During the pT, T 1s period, system
B under policy u does the same action as system A under the optimal policy. Note that during
this period both systems incur the same holding cost and transit into state pn`NT `NT 1 ´ 1, 0q
afterwards. Thus, J˚pn` 1, dq ° Jupn, dq implies that max trpd1q, r¯pd1qu plus the expected reward
from a task with d “ 0 is higher than the expected reward from a task with d “ d1.
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Now, consider two systems, C and D, which are at states pn, dq and pn ´ 1, dq, respectively.
We intend to design a policy u1 for system C so that it outperforms system D operating under
the optimal policy. Under policy u1, system C continues testing on the current task until the
intensity of preference is d1, and then it releases the task in process and collects the expected
reward of max trpd1q, r¯pd1qu. It then continues performing tests on the next task in line until system
D releases its current task. From J˚pn` 1, dq ° J˚pn, dq, we know that max trpd1q, r¯pd1qu plus the
expected reward from a task with d “ 0 is higher than the expected reward from a task with d “ d1.
It follows that Ju
1pn, dq ° J˚pn´ 1, dq.
Lemmas 11-14 establish structural properties of the optimal value function when the objective
is to maximize the total discounted value. An argument based on SEN Conditions (Sennott 1999),
similar to that of Appendix A.2, extends all these properties to the long-run average objective.
Then, these properties are used to prove the main results of the chapter, as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2:
From Lemma 12, if J˚pn, dq ´ r¯ppdq “ J˚pn´ 1, 0q then J˚pn, d´ 1q ´ r¯ppd´1q “ J˚pn´ 1, 0q.
That is, if it is optimal to stop the search at state pn, dq and identify the current task in favor of s¯,
the same action is also optimal at state pn, d ´ 1q. Thus, there exists threshold d¯pnq so that it is
optimal to terminate testing in favor of state s¯ if d § d¯pnq. Similarly, Lemma 13 implies that there
exists a threshold dpnq so that it is optimal to terminate testing in favor of state s if d • dpnq. It
remains to characterize the optimal action at states pn, dq with d¯pnq † d † dpnq.
Our goal is to prove that if dismissing an unprocessed task from the queue is optimal at states
pn, d1q and pn, d2q for some d¯pnq † d1 † d2 † dpnq, then the same action is also optimal at state
pn, dq with d1 † d † d2. First, note that Lemma 14 also implies that dismissing an unprocessed
task is the optimal action at all states pn1, d1q and pn1, d2q with n1 ° n. Hence, releasing the current
task cannot be optimal at any state pn1, dq with n1 ° n and d1 † d † d2. Putting all together,
we deduce that starting from state pn, dq and along any possible sample path, one of the following
happens:
(i) the system reaches state pn, d1q,
(ii) the system reaches state pn, d2q,
(iii) the system reaches state pn1, d1q or pn1, d2q for some n1 ° n,
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(iv) the system dismisses an unprocessed task prior to reaching any of the above states.
In all of cases (i)-(iv), an unprocessed task must be dismissed from the queue. In other words,
along any sample path from state pn, dq, a task is dismissed from the queue before reaching state
p0, 0q. However, this cannot be optimal because the system would have been better o↵ by dismissing
that task now rather than incurring the holding cost over a non-zero time and then dismissing it
without any processing. This means that it should be the optimal action at state pn, dq to dismiss
a task from the queue.
Proof of Theorem 3:
From Lemma 11, if J˚pn, dq´J˚pn´1, 0q “ r¯ppdq then J˚pn`1, dq´J˚pn, 0q “ r¯ppdq. That is,
if identifying the current task in favor of s¯ is optimal at state pn, dq, the same action is also optimal
at state pn` 1, dq. This implies that d¯pnq is increasing. Similarly, if J˚pn, dq´ J˚pn´ 1, 0q “ rppdq
then J˚pn` 1, dq ´ J˚pn, 0q “ rppdq. As a result, dpnq is decreasing.
Furthermore, from Lemma 14 it follows that if J˚pn, dq ´ J˚pn´ 1, dq “ 0 then J˚pn` 1, dq ´
J˚pn, dq “ 0. That is, if dismissing a task from the queue is optimal at state pn, dq, the same action
is also optimal at state pn ` 1, dq. This completes the proof about the monotonicity of dˆpnq and
dˇpnq.
Proof of Corollary 1:
From Equation (3.1), note that the two actions of dismissing a task from the queue and releasing
the task in process in favor of state s¯ are identical at any state pn, 0q, which implies that d¯pnq § 0 §
dˆpnq. Therefore, dismissing a task from the queue always dominates releasing the task in process
in favor of state s¯ when d ° 0.
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Appendix C
Chapter 4 Results
This appendix includes the proofs to all analytical results presented in the chapter.
Proof of Lemma 1:
The shortest time necessary to reach the target M˜ is achieved when the market grows at the
fastest possible pace, which occurs if the program o↵ers the payo↵ pt “ 8 and attracts the entire
potential demand in all periods. Then,  t “ ct{pt “ 0, and Mt “ pn` 1qMt´1.
It follows that
M0pn` 1qT • M˜ ô T •
log
´
M˜
M0
¯
logpn` 1q ô T •
S
log
´
M˜
M0
¯
logpn` 1q
W
.
To proceed to the proof of Proposition 4, the following lemmas are needed.
Lemma 15. If F p.q has the IGFR property, then upxq “ ≥1x xfpxqdx{px2fpxqq Œ x.
Proof:We start by showing that vpxq “ ≥1x xfpxqdx{pxF¯ pxqq is decreasing in x.
v1pxq “
ˆ
xfpxq
ª 1
x
xfpxqdx´ F¯ pxq
ª 1
x
xfpxqdx´ x2fpxqF¯ pxq
˙
{`x2F¯ 2pxq˘ .
To show that v1pxq § 0, it su ces to verify that its numerator is non-positive, or, wpxq “
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F¯ pxq ≥1x xfpxqdx` x2fpxqF¯ pxq ´ xfpxq ≥1x xfpxqdx • 0. For this,
w1pxq “ `xf 1pxq ` fpxq˘´xF¯ pxq ´ ª 1
x
xfpxqdx
¯
´ fpxq
ª 1
x
xfpxqdx.
The IGFR assumption implies that xfpxq{F¯ pxq Õ x and hence,
xf2pxq ` pxf 1pxq ` fpxqqF¯ pxq • 0 ñ xf 1pxq ` fpxq • ´xf
2pxq
F¯ pxq
ñ w1pxq • ´fpxq
F¯ pxq
´
x2fpxqF¯ pxq ´ xfpxq
ª 1
x
xfpxqdx` F¯ pxq
ª 1
x
xfpxqdx
¯
“ ´fpxq
F¯ pxq wpxq.
Therefore, for any x satisfying wpxq § 0, we have w1pxq • 0. In other words, wpxq is increasing
wherever it is non-positive. Since wp0q ° 0, the function should remain non-negative over its
domain, r0, 1s. As a result, v1pxq § 0 for x P r0, 1s. Noting that upxq “ vpxqF¯ pxq{pxfpxqq completes
the proof.
Lemma 16. Both functions gp.q and hp.q are decreasing. Hence, hp.q is invertible, and the function
 p.q “ `h´1 ˝ g˘p.q is well-defined and increasing.
Proof:First, consider gpxq. The function is the product of two terms. The first term is
decreasing in x since F¯ pxq is decreasing in x, and the second term is decreasing in x as implied by
Lemma 15. Thus, gpxq also decreases with x.
Next, consider hpxq and take its first derivative:
h1pxq “ ´ ↵nfpxq
´
1` ` ª 1
x
xfpxqdx˘{`x2fpxq˘¯`  p1` nF¯ pxqqu1pxq † 0 ,
where upxq is defined in Lemma 15. Finally, hp.q is strictly decreasing and hence, invertible. Thus,
 p.q is a well-defined increasing function.
Lemma 17. For both Problems (P1) and (P2), the optimal solution satisfies Mt˚ † pn` 1qMt˚´1.
Further, there exists ⌧˚ so that Mt˚ “Mt˚´1 if t § ⌧˚, and Mt˚ °Mt˚´1 otherwise.
Proof:Equations (4.3) and (4.4) together imply thatMt˚ “Mt˚´1`nMt˚´1F¯ p t˚ q § pn`1qMt˚´1.
However, for the equality to hold, we need to have  t˚ “ 0 which is equivalent to pt˚ “ 8. This
never holds under the optimal policy since it makes the objective function unbounded.
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Now we show the second part of the lemma by contradiction. Suppose there exists a period t
so that mt˚ “ 0 but mt˚´1 ° 0. We o↵er the current pt˚ (which stimulates zero investment) in period
t´ 1, and the current pt˚´1 in period t while keeping everything else fixed. The objective function
improves due to discounting, which contradicts optimality.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Let ztpx, yq denote the minimum cost to reach the market size y, starting from the initial
capacity x, and within t periods. First consider single period problem z1px, yq. Due to Equation
(4.2), c “ c0px{M0q´↵, and the potential demand is nx. From Equation (4.3), p should be such
that   “ c{p attracts the additional y ´ x installation, that is,
nxF¯ p q “ y ´ x ñ   “ F¯´1
´y ´ x
nx
¯
ñ p “ c
F¯´1
`py ´ xq{pnxq˘ “ c0
`
x{M0˘´↵
F¯´1
`py ´ xq{pnxq˘ .
From the objective function of Problem (P1), it follows that
z1px, yq “  ppy ´ xqE “✓ˇˇ✓ •  ‰ “  nc0M↵0 x1´↵
≥1
F¯´1
`
py´xq{pnxq
˘ ✓fp✓qd✓
F¯´1
`py ´ xq{pnxq˘ .
Express ztpM0,Mtq recursively:
ztpM0,Mtq “ min
Mt´1
 
zt´1pM0,Mt´1q `  tz1pMt´1,Mtq( . (C.1)
Since the market size expands by at most a factor of pn` 1q in each period, we have
Mt´1 P
„
max
"
M0,
Mt
n` 1
*
,min
 
M0pn` 1qt´1,Mt(⇢ . (C.2)
Applying the Envelope Theorem on ztpM0,Mtq, we obtain
 t
Bz1pMt˚´1,Mtq
BMt “
´
 t`1nc0M↵0 pMt˚´1q1´↵
¯B
»–´F¯´1´Mt´M˚t´1
nM˚t´1
¯¯´1 ≥1
F¯´1
´
Mt´M˚t´1
nM˚t´1
¯ ✓fp✓qd✓
fifl
BMt ,
whereMt˚´1 is the solution to the dynamic program (C.1). Denote  t˚ “ F¯´1
´`
Mt´Mt˚´1
˘{`nMt˚´1˘¯,
we can derive
BztpM0,Mtq
BMt “  
t`1c0M↵0 pMt˚´1q´↵
´
1`
≥1
 ˚t
✓fp✓qd✓
p t˚ q2fp t˚ q
¯
.
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Following similar steps for zt´1pM0,Mt´1q, we have
Bzt´1pM0,Mt´1q
BMt´1 “  
tc0M
↵
0 pMt˚´2q´↵
´
1`
≥1
 ˚t´1
✓fp✓qd✓
p t˚´1q2fp t˚´1q
¯
.
Lemma 17 implies Mt˚´1 “ M0 if t ´ 1 § ⌧˚. For t ° ⌧˚ ` 1, the lemma implies that the optimal
value for Mt´1 does not occur at the boundaries of the feasible range given in Equation (C.2).
Thus, the first order condition must hold at Mt˚´1. That is,
Bzt´1pM0,Mt´1q
BMt´1 `  
t Bz1pMt´1,Mtq
BMt´1 “ 0. (C.3)
To proceed, we first derive the second term as
 t
Bz1pMt´1,Mtq
BMt´1 “  
t`1nc0M↵0
# p1´ ↵qpMt´1q´↵ ≥1 t ✓fp✓qd✓
 t
´ MtpMt´1q
1´↵
npMt´1q2
´
1`
≥1
 t
✓fp✓qd✓
 2t fp tq
¯+
.
Also note that Mt{Mt´1 “ 1` nF¯ p tq, the first order condition (C.3) becomes
`
1`nF¯ p t˚´1q
˘↵´
1`
≥1
 ˚t´1
✓fp✓qd✓
p t˚´1q2fp t˚´1q
¯
“  
$&%np↵´ 1q
≥1
 ˚t
✓fp✓qd✓
 t˚
` `1` nF¯ p t˚ q˘´1`
≥1
 ˚t
✓fp✓qd✓
p t˚ q2fp t˚ q
¯,.- ,
which impliesgp t˚´1q “ hp t˚ q. Putting everything together, we conclude that  t˚ “ 1 (no installa-
tion) for periods t § ⌧˚, and  t˚ “  p t˚´1q for t ° ⌧˚ ` 1.
To establish uniqueness, we apply Mt˚ “ Mt˚´1p1 ` nF¯ p t˚ qq for t • ⌧˚ ` 1 iteratively, and
rewrite the constraint MT˚ • M˜ as
M0
Tπ
t“⌧˚`1
p1` nF¯ p t˚ qq • M˜ ñ M0
Tπ
t“⌧˚`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧˚´1qp ˚⌧˚`1q˘ı • M˜, (C.4)
where  pkqp.q is the kth convolution of the function  p.q. The left hand side is decreasing in  ˚⌧˚`1
because  p.q and F¯ p.q are increasing and decreasing, respectively. Further, the constraint holds as
an equality under the optimal solution. It follows that for any given ⌧˚, there exists at most one
 ˚⌧˚`1 satisfying the equality constraint, and this value also uniquely determines the entire sequence
of  t˚ ’s.
It remains to show that ⌧˚ is unique. Consider periods ⌧˚ and ⌧˚`1 under the optimal policy.
By definition of ⌧˚, we have M˚⌧˚ “ M0 (i.e.,  ˚⌧˚ “ 1) and M˚⌧˚`1 ° M0. If ⌧˚ ° 0, consider
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starting from capacityM0 before period ⌧˚ and aiming at meeting the targetM˚⌧˚`1 in two periods,
we have
Bz2pM0,M˚⌧˚`1q
BM⌧˚
ˇˇˇ
M⌧˚“M0
° 0 ñ gp1q ´ hp ˚⌧˚`1q ° 0 ñ  ˚⌧˚`1 °  p1q. (C.5)
Moreover, for t ° ⌧˚ ` 1 we have
 t˚ “  p t˚´1q §  p1q. (C.6)
Now, by contradiction, assume that there are two distinct values ⌧1 † ⌧2 both optimal, and
therefore satisfy Equation (C.4) in equality. Let ⌧2 ° ⌧1 • 0, and denote their corresponding
optimal sequences by t 1t u and t 2t u, respectively. Since  2⌧2`1 °  p1q (Equation(C.5)) and  1⌧2`1 §
 p1q (Equation (C.6)), we have  2⌧2`1 °  1⌧2`1. Also, Equation (C.4) implies
M˜ “ M0
Tπ
t“⌧1`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧1´1qp 1⌧1`1q˘ı
“ M0
⌧2π
t“⌧1`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧1´1qp 1⌧1`1q˘ı Tπ
t“⌧2`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧2´1qp 1⌧2`1q˘ı
° M0
Tπ
t“⌧2`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧2´1qp 1⌧2`1q˘ı °M0 Tπ
t“⌧2`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧2´1qp 2⌧2`1q˘ı “ M˜,
which is a contradiction. Thus, ⌧˚ is unique and satisfies
⌧˚ “ max
#
0, max
#
⌧
ˇˇˇ
M0
Tπ
t“⌧`1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´⌧qp1q˘ı ° M˜++ . (C.7)
Proof of Lemma 2:
We start by proving that Zpc˜˚, T q ´∞8t“T`1  t⇧ is monotone in parameters ↵, c0, n, and ⇧.
First, consider ↵1 † ↵2, and the corresponding  1t , m1t , c1t , p1t and Z1p., .q at optimality when ↵
takes value ↵1. When ↵ takes value ↵2, consider a policy which o↵ers payo↵s p2t that induce the
same amount of installation in each period, that is, m2t “ m1t . For this to hold, Equation (4.3)
implies that  2t “  1t for all t. This, together with Equation (4.2) gives us
c2t § c1t ñ p2t § p1t ñ p2tm2tE
“
✓
ˇˇ
✓ •  2t
‰ § p1tm1tE “✓ˇˇ✓ •  1t ‰ ñ Z2pc˜˚, T q § Z1pc˜˚, T q.
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The same logic applies to show the monotonicity in c0 and n, and we omit the details. (For
parameter n, from n2 ° n1 and m2t “ m1t we obtain  2t °  1t . Then, we use the monotonicity of
vp.q, introduced in the proof of Lemma 15, to deduce the result.) Finally, Zpc˜˚, T q ´∞8t“T`1  t⇧
is monotone in ⇧ since Zpc˜˚, T q does not depend on ⇧.
Now, consider (P2). We know that ↵2 ° ↵1 results in Z2pc˜˚, T q § Z1pc˜˚, T q for any feasible
T , including T 1, the optimal T when ↵ “ ↵1. Therefore
Z1pc˜˚q “
«
Z1pc˜˚, T 1q ´
8ÿ
t“T 1`1
 t⇧
 
•
«
Z2pc˜˚, T 1q ´
8ÿ
t“T 1`1
 t⇧
 
• Z2pc˜˚q .
Thus, there exists ↵ so that Zpc˜˚q § 0 if and only if ↵ • ↵. The same argument applies for c0, n,
and ⇧.
Proof of Proposition 5:
We only need to show that ⌧˚ “ 0 for Problem (P2). The rest follows from Proposition 4.
Suppose ⌧˚ ° 0 instead. At optimality, pt˚ “ ct˚ (i.e.,  t˚ “ 1) for t “ 1, . . . , ⌧˚, and pt˚ ° ct˚
(i.e.,  t˚ † 1) for t • ⌧˚ ` 1. Consider a policy u which o↵ers payo↵s put “ p˚t`⌧˚ in periods
t “ 1, . . . , T ´⌧˚. Then, policy u stimulates the same investment schedule and incurs the same cost
as the optimal policy, except ⌧˚ periods earlier. Moreover, policy u achieves the grid parity target
⌧˚ periods ahead of the optimal policy. It follows that Zupc˜˚q “ Zpc˜˚q{ ⌧˚ † Zpc˜˚q, where the
inequality follows from the fact that the technology is desirable, and hence Zpc˜˚q † 0. However,
note that Zupc˜˚q † Zpc˜˚q, which contradicts optimality.
The proof of Theorem 4 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 18. If ⌧˚ ° 0 in the solution to Problem (P1), then t t˚ ut“1,...,T is decreasing in t.
Proof:Proof. As derived in the proof of Proposition 4, if ⌧˚ ° 0, then  ˚⌧˚`1 °  p1q. The
function  p.q is increasing and hence,
 p1q •  p ˚⌧˚`1q ñ  ˚⌧˚`1 °  p ˚⌧˚`1q “  ˚⌧˚`2 ñ  p ˚⌧˚`1q °  p ˚⌧˚`2q ñ  ˚⌧˚`2 °  ˚⌧˚`3 .
The same logic can be applied iteratively to show that  t˚ Œ t for all t ° ⌧˚. Since  t˚ “ 1 for
t § ⌧˚ and  t˚ † 1 for t ° ⌧˚, the entire sequence t t˚ ut“1,...,T is decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 6:
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Suppose ⇡t˚ Õ t, i.e.,  t˚ Œ t. It follows that
 t˚`1 §  t˚ ñ F¯´1
´mt˚`1
nMt˚
¯
§ F¯´1
´ mt˚
nMt˚´1
¯
ñ mt˚`1
nMt˚
• mt˚
nMt˚´1
ñ mt˚`1 • mt˚ .
Thus, mt˚ Õ t. When  t˚ Õ t, on the other hand, we have
 t˚`1 •  t˚ ñ . . . ñ
mt˚`1
nMt˚´1
`
1` nF¯ p t˚ q
˘ § mt˚
nMt˚´1
ñ mt˚`1
1` nF¯ p t˚ q § mt˚ .
In this case, it is possible for mt˚`1 to be bigger or smaller than mt˚ .
Proof of Proposition 7:
Define function  pxq “ gpxq´hpxq. Recall the definition of upxq from Lemma 15, the derivative
of  p.q is
 1pxq “ ´n↵fpxqp1` nF¯ pxqq↵´1`1` upxq˘` p1` nF¯ pxqq↵u1pxq
´ np1´ ↵qfpxq`1` upxq˘`  nfpxq`1` upxq˘´  p1` nF¯ pxqqu1pxq
“
´
  ´ p1` nF¯ pxqq↵´1
¯´
n↵fpxq`1` upxq˘´ p1` nF¯ pxqqu1pxq¯. (C.8)
Following Lemma 15, u1pxq § 0. Therefore the second term in  1pxq is always positive. The first
term is decreasing in x, and equals  ´p1`nq↵´1 when x “ 0. Suppose the condition of Proposition 7
holds. Then, the first term is non-positive for all x P r0, 1s, and  p.q decreasing accordingly. Finally,
 p1q “ gp1q ´ hp1q “ 1´   • 0. Thus,  pxq • 0 for all x P r0, 1s. In particular,
 p ˚⌧˚`1q • 0 ñ gp ˚⌧˚`1q • hp ˚⌧˚`1q ñ  p ˚⌧˚`1q §  ˚⌧˚`1 ñ  ˚⌧˚`2 §  ˚⌧˚`1 ,
which implies that the optimal sequence of  t˚ ’s must be decreasing.
Next, we present the following lemma which will be used in the proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma 19. The solution to equation  ¯ “  p ¯q is unique if exists. If  ¯ exists and ⌧˚ “ 0 in the
optimal solution to Problem (P1), then the sequence of  t˚ ’s is decreasing if and only if
M0
`
1` nF¯ p ¯q˘T ° M˜.
Proof: Let  pxq “ gpxq ´ hpxq.  ¯ “  p ¯q is equivalent to  p ¯q “ 0. Recall Equation (C.8),
and that the second term is always positive. Since the first term is decreasing in x, if it is positive
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for some x “ x1, it is also positive for all x § x1. This implies that  pxq is unimodal over domain
r0, 1s. Moreover,  p1q “ 1´   • 0, so  pxq “ 0 has at most one root.
Suppose  ¯ exists and ⌧˚ “ 0. Then,  ¯ “  p ¯q implies that
M0
`
1` nF¯ p ¯q˘T ° M˜ ô M0 Tπ
t“1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´1qp ¯q˘ı ° M˜ “M0 Tπ
t“1
”
1` nF¯ ` pt´1qp 1˚ q˘ı ,
where the last equality follows from ⌧˚ “ 0 and Equation (C.4), which holds as an equality at
optimality. This further implies  1˚ °  ¯. Then,  p.q being unimodal over r0, 1s together with
 p1q • 0 implies that  p 1˚ q ° 0. Finally,
 p 1˚ q ° 0 ô gp 1˚ q ° hp 1˚ q ô hp 2˚ q ° hp 1˚ q ô  2˚ †  1˚ ,
where the third inequality follows from gp 1˚ q “ hp 2˚ q. Thus, the sequence is decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 5:
We try to find values of ↵ for which solution  ¯p↵q, as in Lemma 19, exists, and ⌧˚p↵q “ 0, and
the sequence of  t˚ p↵q’s is a constant. Equivalently, we want to find ↵ so that  t˚ p↵q “  ¯p↵q for
t “ 1, . . . , T . For such values of ↵, Equation (C.4) gives us
M0
Tπ
t“1
”
1` nF¯
´
 pt´1q
`
 1˚ p↵q;↵
˘¯ı “M0`1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘T “ M˜
ñ  ¯p↵q “ F¯´1
«
n´1
´´ M˜
M0
¯ 1
T ´ 1
¯ 
. (C.9)
Next we show that  ¯p↵q is unimodal in ↵ and hence Equation (C.9) has at most two solutions. By
definition of  ¯p↵q, we have  p ¯p↵q;↵q “ gp ¯p↵q;↵q ´ hp ¯p↵q;↵q “ 0, which lead to
d ¯p↵q
d↵
“
´´B p ¯p↵q;↵q
B↵
¯´B p ¯p↵q;↵q
B 
¯´1 “
$’&’%
`
1` up ¯p↵qq˘`1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘↵
p1´ ↵q
´
u1p ¯p↵qq ´ `1` up ¯p↵qq˘ ↵nfp ¯p↵qq`
1`nF¯ p ¯p↵qq
˘¯
,/./- ¨
#
 
`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘1´↵ ´ log `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘1´↵ ´ 1`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘↵ ´  `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘
+
.
Note that the first bracket is always negative (u1p.q § 0 from Lemma 15). Further,  p ¯p↵q;↵q “ 0
implies that the denominator of the second bracket is also negative and hence, d ¯p↵q{d↵ has the
same sign as the numerator.
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Now, assume d ¯p↵q{d↵ is positive at ↵ “ ↵1. We will show that the derivative is also positive
at ↵ “ ↵1 ´ ✏, for infinitesimal ✏. Define kp↵q “ `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘1´↵. Then,
d ¯p↵q
d↵
ˇˇˇ
↵“↵1
° 0 ñ  kp↵1q ´ log kp↵1q ´ 1 ° 0 ñ  kp↵1q ° 1 ñ   ´ 1
kp↵1q ° 0. (C.10)
Moreover, the derivative being positive at ↵ “ ↵1 entails  ¯p↵1 ´ ✏q †  ¯p↵1q. It follows that
kp↵1 ´ ✏q ° kp↵1q. According to Equation (C.10), ` kp↵q ´ log kp↵q ´ 1˘ is increasing in kp↵q at
kp↵q “ kp↵1q. Thus,
 kp↵1 ´ ✏q ´ log kp↵1 ´ ✏q ´ 1 °  kp↵1q ´ log kp↵1q ´ 1 ° 0 ñ d ¯p↵q
d↵
ˇˇˇ
↵“↵1´✏
° 0.
This means that if d ¯p↵q{d↵ is positive at ↵ “ ↵1, it is also positive at any ↵ † ↵1. Thus,  ¯p↵q is
unimodal in ↵, which implies that Equation (C.9) has at most two solutions, ↵ˆ § ↵ˇ.
First, consider ↵ˆ. We have M0
`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵ˆ´ ✏qq˘T ° M˜ because  ¯p↵q is increasing at ↵ “ ↵ˆ.
From Lemma 19, the sequence of  t˚ p↵q’s is decreasing at ↵ “ ↵ˆ ´ ✏, and increasing at ↵ “ ↵ˆ ` ✏.
Similarly, the sequence is increasing at ↵ˇ´ ✏ and decreasing at ↵ˇ` ✏.
It remains to see what happens when  ¯p↵q does not exist or when ⌧˚ ° 0. If  ¯p↵q does not exist
for a given ↵, then  p q “ 0 does not have a solution. The unimodality of this function together
with  p1q • 0 imply that  p q ° 0 for all  , which gives us
gp q ° hp q for all   ñ gp T˚´1q ° hp T˚´1q ñ  p T˚´1q †  T˚´1 ñ  T˚ †  T˚´1.
In this case, the sequence is decreasing. By Lemma 18, the same is true when ⌧˚ ° 0.
Finally, we note that  T˚ p↵q ´  T˚´1p↵q is continuous in ↵. Thus, it does not change sign
without going through zero (at which point the sequence is a constant). We conclude that the
monotonicity of sequence t t˚ p↵qut“1,...,T changes only when  ¯p↵q exists and ⌧˚ “ 0. Further, when
these conditions hold, the direction of monotonicity changes at most twice, so that the first change
is from decreasing to increasing and the second is from increasing to decreasing.
For the last part of the theorem, recall M0
`
1 ` nF¯ p ¯p↵ˆqq˘T “ M0`1 ` nF¯ p ¯p↵ˇqq˘T “ M˜ . If
T increases or M˜ decreases, the left hand side becomes bigger than the right hand side. Then, by
Lemma 19, the sequence decreases at ↵ˆ and ↵ˇ. It follows that an increase in T or a decrease in M˜
leads to an increase in ↵ˆ and a decrease in ↵ˇ, which completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 6:
Similar to Proof of Theorem 5, we look for value(s) of ↵ such that  ¯p↵q exists, ⌧˚p↵q “ 0,
and the sequence of  t˚ p↵q’s is a constant. Equivalently, we want to find ↵ so that  t˚ p↵q “  ¯p↵q
for t “ 1, . . . , T . For such value(s) of ↵, applying Equation (C.4), and noting that ⌧˚p↵q “ 0 and
 p ¯p↵qq “  ¯p↵q gives us M0`1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘T “ M˜ , where M˜ is the cumulative capacity equivalent
to the cost c˜, and can be derived from Equation (4.2) as M˜ “M0`c˜{c0˘´1↵ .
Next, for any given ↵, define  p↵q to be the value of   which satisfies
M0
`
1` nF¯ p p↵qq˘T “M0`c˜{c0˘´1↵ .
Then, we are looking for value(s) of ↵ for which  ¯p↵q “  p↵q. Our goal is to show that if such ↵
exists, then  ¯p↵q ´  p↵q is decreasing at this point. Hence, there exists at most one value for ↵
with this property.
Recall the expression of d ¯p↵q{d↵ from the proof of Theorem 5. This derivative is either
negative, or we can use u1p.q § 0 (from Lemma 15) to obtain
d ¯p↵q
d↵
§
$’&’%
`
1` up ¯p↵qq˘`1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘↵
p↵´ 1q`1` up ¯p↵qq˘ ↵nfp ¯p↵qq`
1`nF¯ p ¯p↵qq
˘
,/./-
#
 
`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘1´↵ ´ log `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘1´↵ ´ 1`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘↵ ´  `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘
+
§ `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘´  kp↵q ´ log kp↵q ´ 1`
1´  kp↵q˘p↵´ 1q↵nfp ¯p↵qq¯,
where kp↵q “ `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵qq˘1´↵. On the other hand, we note that
d p↵q
d↵
“
´
c˜
c0
¯´1
↵
log
´
c˜
c0
¯
´n↵2Tfp p↵qq`1` nF¯ p p↵qq˘T´1 “ `1` nF¯ p p↵qq˘
log
´
c˜
c0
¯
´n↵2Tfp p↵qq .
When  ¯p↵q “  p↵q “  ˚, we want to prove that
max
#
0,
`
1` nF¯ p ˚q˘´  kp↵q ´ log kp↵q ´ 1`
1´  kp↵q˘p↵´ 1q↵nfp ˚q¯
+
´ `1` nF¯ p ˚q˘ log
´
c˜
c0
¯
´n↵2Tfp ˚q † 0
  kp↵q ´ log kp↵q ´ 1
1´  kp↵q °
p1´ ↵q log
´
c˜
c0
¯
↵T
  kp↵q ´ log kp↵q ´ 1
1´  kp↵q °
´p1´ ↵q↵T log `1` nF¯ p ˚q˘
↵T
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  kp↵q ´ log kp↵q ´ 1
1´  kp↵q ° ´ log
`
1` nF¯ p ˚q˘1´↵ “ ´ log kp↵q   kp↵q ´ 1 °  kp↵q log kp↵q,
which holds for any kp↵q ° 1{ . Now, we show that kp↵q satisfies this lower bound:
 p ˚q “ 0 ñ `1` nF¯ p ˚q˘↵ ´  `1` nF¯ p ˚q˘ † 0 ñ  `1` nF¯ p ˚q˘1´↵ ° 1 ñ kp↵q ° 1
 
.
Therefore, among all ↵’s for which  ¯p↵q exists and ⌧˚p↵q “ 0, there exists at most one value
which makes the sequence of  t˚ p↵q’s a constant. Call this value ↵ˇ. We know that  ¯p↵q ´  p↵q is
decreasing at ↵ “ ↵ˇ. Thus,  ¯p↵ˇ´ ✏q °  p↵ˇ´ ✏q which implies
M0
`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵ˇ´ ✏qq˘T †M0´ c˜
c0
¯´1
↵
.
Lemma 19 implies that the sequence of  t˚ p↵q’s is increasing for ↵ “ ↵ˇ ´ ✏, and decreasing for
↵ “ ↵ˇ ` ✏. The argument for the case where  ¯p↵q does not exist or ⌧˚p↵q ° 0 follows the exact
same logic as in the proof of Theorem 5. We conclude that the direction of monotonicity in the
t t˚ p↵qut“1,...,T sequence can change only when  ¯p↵q exists and ⌧˚p↵q “ 0. Further, when these
conditions hold, the direction of monotonicity changes at most once, so that it goes from increasing
to decreasing.
Finally, the existence of threshold ↵ which determines the desirability of the technology imme-
diately follows from Lemma 2.
Proof of Corollary 2:
Theorem 6 implies the result except T is variable here. Thus, we need to show that the direction
of monotonicity in the t t˚ p↵qut“1,...,T˚ sequence does not change when T˚ changes. For this, let
T˚p↵q and Tminp↵q be as defined before, when the learning parameter is ↵. Then,
Tminp↵q “
S
log
´
c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵
logpn` 1q
W
,
which is decreasing in ↵. When ⇧ is big, the optimal policy achieves the target as fast as possible so
that T˚p↵q approaches Tminp↵q. More precisely, when ⇧ is su ciently large, decreasing T always
improves the objective function as long as it remains feasible and does not make the cost unlimited.
Hence, T˚p↵q ´ Tminp↵q § 1 and T˚p↵q also decreases with ↵.
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We start from ↵ “ 1 and gradually decrease ↵. Suppose ↵1 is a value of ↵ at which T˚ changes
so that T 1 and T 1 ` 1 are both optimal. If the sequence is decreasing at ↵1 when T “ T 1, it
remains decreasing for T “ T 1 ` 1 due to monotonicity of ↵ˇpc˜˚, T q in T (see Theorem 6). On the
other hand, suppose the sequence is increasing at ↵1 when T “ T 1. Therefore,  ¯p↵1q exists. Since
the ratio c0{c˜˚ is su ciently large, we can write
log
´
c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵
log
`
1` nF¯ p ¯p↵1qq˘ ´
S
log
´
c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵
logpn` 1q
W
° 2 ñ log
´ c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵ ° `Tminp↵1q ` 2˘ log `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵1qq˘
ñ
´ c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵ ° `1` nF¯ p ¯p↵1qq˘Tminp↵1q`2 ñ M0´ c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵ °M0`1` nF¯ p ¯p↵1qq˘T 1`1.
It follows from Lemma 19 that the sequence is also increasing at ↵1 when T “ T 1 ` 1.
Proof of Theorem 7:
Let  ¯pnq, ⌧˚pnq and  t˚ pnq be as defined before, when the penetration coe cient is n. We are
interested to find the values of n for which  ¯pnq exists, ⌧˚pnq “ 0, and the sequence of  t˚ pnq’s is a
constant. Equivalently, we want to find n so that  t˚ pnq “  ¯pnq for t “ 1, . . . , T . For such values of
n, Equation (C.4) together with  p ¯pnqq “  ¯pnq and ⌧˚pnq “ 0 give us
M0
`
1` nF¯ p ¯pnqq˘T “M0´ c˜˚
c0
¯´1
↵ ñ nF¯ p ¯pnqq “
´ c˜˚
c0
¯ ´1
↵T ´ 1.
Next, we show that nF¯ p ¯pnqq is monotone in n and hence, the above equation has at most one
solution. By definition of  ¯pnq, we have
 p ¯pnq;nq “ 0 ñ dnF¯ p ¯pnqq
dn
“ F¯ p ¯pnqq ` nfp ¯pnqq
´B p ¯pnq;nq
Bn
¯´B p ¯pnq;nq
B 
¯´1
.
Now, note that
B p ¯pnq;nq
B  “
´
  ´ p1` nF¯ p ¯pnqqq↵´1
¯´
n↵fp ¯pnqq`1` up ¯pnqq˘´ p1` nF¯ p ¯pnqqqu1p ¯pnqq¯,
and
`
1 ` nF¯ p ¯pnqq˘↵ ´  `1 ` nF¯ p ¯pnqq˘ † 0, which is implied by  p ¯pnq;nq “ 0. After applying
the above two equations, it follows that dnF¯ p ¯pnqq{dn has the same sign as“`
1` nF¯ p ¯pnqq˘↵ ´  `1` nF¯ p ¯pnqq˘‰u1p ¯pnqqF¯ p ¯pnqq
``1` up ¯pnqq˘fp ¯pnqq “ ↵nF¯ p ¯pnqq `   ´ `1` nF¯ p ¯pnqq˘↵‰ .
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The first term is always positive, and the second term is positive if nF¯ p ¯pnqq is large enough, which
happens when the ratio c0{c˜˚ is su ciently large. We conclude that among all n’s for which  ¯pnq
exists and ⌧˚pnq “ 0, there exists at most one value which makes the sequence of  t˚ pnq’s a constant.
Call this value nˇ. Since nF¯ p ¯pnqq is increasing at n “ nˇ, we have
pnˇ´ ✏qF¯ ` ¯pnˇ´ ✏q˘ † nˇF¯ ` ¯pnˇq˘ “ ´ c˜˚
c0
¯ ´1
↵T ´ 1.
From Lemma 19, the sequence of  t˚ pnq’s is increasing for n “ nˇ´ ✏, and decreasing for n “ nˇ` ✏.
The argument for the case where  ¯pnq does not exist or ⌧˚pnq ° 0 follows the exact same logic as
in the proof of Theorem 5. Therefore, the direction of monotonicity in the t t˚ pnqut“1,...,T sequence
can change only when  ¯pnq exists and ⌧˚pnq “ 0. Further, when these conditions hold, the direction
of monotonicity changes at most once, so that it goes from increasing to decreasing.
Finally, the existence of threshold n which determines the desirability of the technology follows
from Lemma 2.
Proof of Corollary 3:
The proof is very similar to that of Corollary 2.
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